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A CALL FOR A VALUE-BASED TEST OF
COMMERCIAL SPEECH*
RICHARD L. BARNES**
The commercial speech doctrine made its first appearance over forty-
three years ago in Valentine v. Chrestensen I and it lay virtually dormant
until Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission On Human Rela-
tions,2 decided in 1973. With such scant Supreme Court precedent for
direction it is not surprising that in 1976 the Court in Virginia State
Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council preserved the
distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech, but an-
nounced limited protection for commercial speech.3
The grant of limited protection of commercial speech has made the
distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech less impor-
tant.4 In some ways, however, the distinction has become more impor-
tant because the Court's decision implicitly embraces unarticulated
normative values in constitutional interpretation.5 Had commercial
speech remained wholly unprotected, an opportunity to inquire into nor-
mative values to explain the lack of protection would have existed.
Although the sanctions on commercial special speech would have been
broader if commercial speech were unprotected, the lack of protection
would not have offered a more significant opportunity to explore norma-
tive values underlying constitutional doctrine. With limited protection,
the possibility exists that particular speech will fall into the less protected
class of speech and be subject to the same sanctions that it would have
* The research for this article was funded in part by the University of South Dakota School of
Law summer research fund generously administered by Dean Walter Reed. Special thanks goes to
William Coughlin, J.D. 1985, University of South Dakota for his research help.
** Visiting Associate Professor of Law, Brigham Young University, J. Reuben Clark School of
Law 1985-86; Assistant Professor of Law, University of South Dakota School of Law; B.A. 1976,
1D. 1979, University of Arizona; LL.M. 1983 Northwestern University.
1. 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
2. 413 U.S. 376 (1973). See also New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964)
(noting the doctrine and observing that profit motive alone does not render speech commercial).
3. See 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
4. See Comment, Commercial Speech: A Proposed Definition, 27 How. L.J. 1015, 1017 (1984)
[hereinafter cited as Comment, Commercial Speech].
5. See Barnes, Commercial Speech Concerning Unlawful Conduct: A Clear and Present Dan-
ger, 1984 B.Y.U. L. REv. 457, 476-93 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Unlawful Commercial Speech].
See also Barnes, Regulations of Speech Intended to Affect Behavior, 63 DEN. L.J. 1 (1985).
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without protection. Similarly, the possibility exists that some people will
speak in the belief that their speech is fully protected, but will find that
because of the Court's definition of commercial speech their speech is
subject to uncontemplated regulation.
The challenge then in defining commercial speech is to formulate a test
that will permit regulation of commercial speech without chilling non-
commercial speech.6 This Article reviews the cases that attempt to de-
fine commercial speech, as well as cases that indicate the normative
values supporting the creation and continuance of the commercial speech
doctrine. These and other cases will be analyzed to determine the nor-
mative values that may have led to the development of the commercial
speech doctrine. This Article concludes that the Court should not de-
velop a test of commerciality until it more fully articulates these underly-
ing values. To illustrate the need for normative development, this
concluding section focuses on Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders,
Inc.7
I. PRIOR SUPREME COURT TESTS
In Chrestensen,8 the Supreme Court declared that regulation of
"purely commercial advertising" does not violate constitutional protec-
tions.9 Chrestensen owned a former United States Navy submarine that
he displayed to the public for paid admission. 10 In 1940 he moored it at a
New York City pier and attempted to distribute handbills advertising the
submarine. Acting under the authority of a New York sanitation ordi-
nance prohibiting distribution of handbills advertising commercial or
business ventures, the police commissioner forced Chrestensen to cease
distribution.1 Chrestensen reprinted the advertisement with a protest
6. Both courts and commentators have attempted to define commercial speech. See, e.g., Vir-
ginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 748; Barrett, The Uncharted Area-Commercial Speech and the First
Amendment, 13 U.C.D. L. REV. 175 (1980); Rotunda, The Commercial Speech Doctrine in the
Supreme Court, 1976 U. ILL. L.F. 1080 (1976); Comment, Standard of Review for Regulation of
Commercial Speech, 66 MINN. L. REv. 903 (1982); Comment, First Amendment Protection for Com-
mercial Advertising: The New Constitutional Doctrine, 44 U. CHI. L. REv. 205 (1976) [hereinafter
cited as Comment, First Amendment]. See generally Barnes, Unlawful Commercial Speech, supra
note 5; Comment, Commercial Speech, supra note 4.
7. 105 S. Ct. 2939 (1985).
8. 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
9. Id. at 54.
10. Id at 53.
11. Id
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against the city's denial of his request to moor the submarine.12 The City
again prohibited Chrestensen from distributing the handbills.13 In con-
cluding that pure commercial advertising enjoyed no first amendment
protection, the Court rejected characterization of the handbill as pro-
tected speech. The Court found that the protest included on the second
handbill was merely a subterfuge to circumvent the ordinance, and was
not a genuine comment on a matter of legitimate public concern.
14
Since the very inception of the commercial speech category, the con-
cern has arisen that some expression may be viewed as both commercial
and noncommercial. Yet the Court in Chrestensen had no trouble deter-
mining that the handbill was commercial. In a variety of factual settings
since Chrestensen, the Court has reiterated that inclusion of matters that
are of legitimate public concern does not transform otherwise commer-
cial speech into fully protected speech.15 The Chrestensen decision fails
to provide any guidance as to how to distinguish commercial from non-
commercial speech. Not all expression concerning matters of public in-
terest is automatically protected. The Court is willing to withhold
constitutional protection when necessary to foster regulation of otherwise
valuable commercial speech. This theme of definition dictated in part by
deference to state regulation is one often repeated in later cases.
The Court has offered little guidance as to what constitutes commer-
cial speech since Chrestensen. The limited development of this concept
can be roughly broken into three stages. The first stage is the entry or
neophyte exploration contained in Bigelow v. Virginia 16 and Virginia
State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc. 17
The factual setting or the procedural posture of the cases unfortunately
rendered the need to distinguish commercial from noncommercial speech
unnecessary. Bates v. State Bar of Arizona,"8 Chralik v. Ohio State Bar,9
In re Primus,2° and Central Hudson Gas and Electric v. Public Service
Corp. ,21 illustrate the uncertainty during the intermediate stage of devel-
12. Id.
13. Id. at 52-53.
14. Id. at 55.
15. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983). But cf Virginia Pharmacy, 425
U.S. at 784 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
16. 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
17. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
18. 433 U.S. 447 (1978).
19. 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
20. 436 U.S. 412 (1978).
21. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
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opment. Because these cases involved distinctions between types of com-
mercial speech and, in Central Hudson, the Court attempted to establish
the standard of review for commercial speech, the Court could have logi-
cally and appropriately eliminated some of the confusion surrounding
the commercial speech doctrine by exploring the values leading to crea-
tion of the doctrine.
In the third stage of development, the Court has focused on the mean-
ing of commercial speech and its normative foundations. As a result of
this retrenching and reconsideration stage, the commercial speech cate-
gory has a more apparent configuration. This "mature period" of devel-
opment reflects the recognition of some members of the Court of a need
for a commercial speech test and for articulation of norms in searching
for a test.
A. The Entry or Neophyte Exploration Stage
In Bigelow, the state of Virginia charged the managing editor of the
Virginia Weekly with violating a statute making it a misdemeanor to en-
courage or prompt procuring of abortions."2 The Weekly had carried an
advertisement for abortions in New York, where they were legal. In
holding that the advertisements were protected speech, the Court de-
clared that commercial speech does not lose all first amendment protec-
tion merely because it is commercial in nature.2" The content of the
advertisements, which included information of "clear 'public interest', '24
was instrumental in persuading the Court.
The Court, perhaps mistakenly, proposed a "public interest" test for
commercial speech in distinguishing the earlier cases of Chrestensen and
Pittsburgh Press. The Court found that the advertisement in Bigelow did
more than simply propose a commercial transaction; it "contained fac-
tual material of clear public interest."2 5 The opinion defined public inter-
est in terms of both audience size and subject matter.26 The Court
22. The statute provided: "If any person by publication, lecture, advertisement, or by the sale
or circulation of any publication, or in any manner, encourages or prompts the procuring of abortion
or miscarriage, he shall be guilty of a misdemeanor." VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-63 (1960) (repealed
1975).
23. See Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 818.
24. Id. at 822.
25. Id.
26. The Court in analyzing the advertisement stated:
[v]iewed in its entirety, the advertisement conveyed information of potential interest and
value to a diverse audience-not only for readers possibly in need of services offered, but
[Vol. 63:649
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declared that the audience must be diverse and that the subject matter
must provoke a general interest.27 There was no attempt to define com-
mercial speech other than the distinction between public interest speech
and general speech.
The Court did not apply the public interest test in Virginia Phar-
macy ;2, it simply stated that commercial speech is that "which does 'no
more than propose a commercial transaction' ."29 Virginia Pharmacy
involved a challenge to a Virginia statute that barred pharmacists from
advertising prescription prices. The plaintiff, a consumer group, argued
that advertising would lead to competition and reduced prices; the state
argued that the statute promoted Virginia's legitimate interest in main-
taining professionalism of its licensed pharmacists. The Court, observing
that a "free flow of commercial information is indispensable,"3 recog-
nized the need for only "limited" protection of commercial speech to
serve this informational function,31 and thus neglected the short-lived
public interest test.
The Court recognized that while not all commercial messages are of
great public interest, most could be easily fashioned to create that ap-
pearance.3 2 Citing Bigelow, the Court declared that an "individual ad-
also for those with a general curiosity about, or general interest in the subject matter or the
law of another state and its development, and to readers seeking reform in Virginia.
Id.
27. Id.
28, 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
29. Id. at 762 (quoting Pittsburgh Press, 413 U.S. at 385; see also 425 U.S. at 775 (Stewart, J.,
concurring)).
The Court's determination that commercial advertising of the kind at issue here is not
"wholly outside the protection of" the First Amendment indicates by its very phrasing that
there are important differences between commercial price and product advertising, on the
one hand, and ideological communication on the other. Ideological expression, be it oral,
literary, pictorial, or theatrical, is integrally related to the exposition of thought-thought
that may shape out concepts of the whole universe of man. Although such expression may
convey factual information relevant to social and individual decisionmaking, it is protected
by the Constitution, whether or not it contains factual representations and even if it in-
cludes inaccurate assertions of fact....
Commercial price and product advertising differs markedly from ideological expression
because it is confined to the promotion of specific goods or services. The First Amendment
protects the advertisement of the "information of potential interest and value" conveyed,
rather than because of any direct contribution to the interchange of ideas.
425 U.S. at 779-80 (citations omitted).
30. Id. at 765.
3 1. Id. at 770-73.
32 Id at 764. The Court noted, as an example, that the pharmacist could transform price
quotat onx into a matter of public interest by "cast[ing] himself as a commentator on store-to-store
dlsparittxc in drug prices, giving his own and those of his competitor as proof."
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vertisement, though entirely 'commercial,' may be of general public
interest. 3 3  The Court suggested that there are common sense differ-
ences between commercial speech and other speech forms. 34 The Court,
however, failed to explain the common sense differences, although it did
note the verifiability and durability of commercial speech.35
B. Intermediate Stage
One year later in Bates,36 the Court attempted to clarify the "no more
than propose a commercial transaction," language of Virginia Pharmacy.
It reiterated the proposition that a profit motive is not determinative of
the issue of limited versus full protection and asserted that speech must
be distinguished by its content.37 It is unclear, however, whether Bates
added a new dimension to the commercial speech definition.
Bates involved two attorneys charged with violating the Arizona
Supreme Court's disciplinary rule prohibiting advertisements for legal
services in newspapers or other media. The charge was based on a legal
clinic's newspaper advertisement offering legal services at "very reason-
able fees" and listing fees for certain services.38 Observing that some ad-
33. Id.
34. IaM at 771 n.24. See infra note 98.
35. 427 U.S. at 771.
36. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
37. Id at 363. See also Barnes, Unlawful Commercial Speech, supra note 5, at 477.
38. Bates, 433 U.S. at 385.
DO YOU NEED
A LAWYER?
LEGAL SERVICES
AT VERY REASONABLE FEES
Divorce or legal separation-uncontested [both spouses sign papers] $175.00 plus $20.00
court filing fee
Preparation of all court papers and instructions on how to do your own simple uncontested
divorce
$100.00
Adoption-uncontested severance proceeding $225.00 plus approximately $10.00 publica-
tion cost
Bankruptcy-non-business, no contested proceedings
Individual
$250.00 plus $55.00 court filing fee
Wife and Husband
$300.00 plus $110.00 court filing fee
Change of Name
$95.00 plus $20.00 court filing fee
Information regarding other types of cases furnished on request
Legal Clinic of Bates & O'Steen
617 North 3rd Street
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vertising would reach uninformed consumers not adequately served by
the legal profession,39 the Court held that the state may not prevent the
publication of truthful advertisements concerning the availability and
terms of routine legal services. 4°
Despite the broad language of Bates, the Court's analysis in In re
Primus4 1 and Ohralik4 2 suggests that it adhered to the vague Virginia
Pharmacy test. Primus, a South Carolina lawyer, was paid a retainer as
a legal consultant for a nonprofit public interest organization, and also
worked for the ACLU without compensation.43 She spoke to a group of
mothers about their right to challenge the requirement of sterilization as
a precondition to their continued public assistance. She discussed the
possibility of a class action suit to end the practice and to seek damages
for past sterilizations.' Later, after receiving ACLU support, she wrote
to one of the mothers offering to file a suit on her behalf.45 The South
Carolina State Bar charged Primus with attempting to solicit a client in
violation of the Canon of Ethics.46 In reversing the disciplinary action,
the Supreme Court emphasized that the solicitation was not for pecuni-
ary gain and that the letter was within the first amendment's protection
of association. The letter was intended to further the ACLU's social and
political aims rather than any financial interest.47 The Court addressed
associational and free expression rights almost interchangeably, but did
not discuss why profit-motivated activities cannot be a legitimate reason
for promoting expression among those persons with similar interests.48
The attorney in Ohralik was similarly disciplined for having solicited
two young women injured in an automobile accident.49 In contrast to
Primus, however, the Supreme Court upheld the disciplinary action
taken against Ohralik.5° The two cases are very difficult to distinguish
Phoenix, Arizona 85004
Telephone (602) 252-8888
Id.
39. Id. at 376.
40. Id. at 384.
41. 436 U.S. 412 (1978).
42. 436 U.S. 442 (1978).
43. 436 U.S. at 414.
44. Id. at 415-16.
45. Id. at 416.
46. Id. at 422, 431-32.
47. Id. at 430-31.
48. Id.
49. See Ohralik, 436 U.S. 447, 457-59 (1978).
50. Id. at 467-68. In his concurring opinion, Justice Marshall observed that reliance on the
Number 4]
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except on the basis that greater public interest existed in the information
offered and suit prepared by Primus. The Court, therefore, seems to
have returned to the Bigelow public interest analysis.
Four years later, citing Virginia Pharmacy and Bates, the Court re-
stated the test of commercial speech in Central Hudson Gas and Electric
v. Public Service Commission." In that case, the Court invalidated a New
York Public Service Commission order prohibiting utilities from promot-
ing energy consumption. 2 The Court adopted a four-part analysis to
determine when commercial speech, defined as "expression related solely
to the economic interests of the speaker and its audience," 3 is to be pro-
tected: (1) whether the speech concerns lawful activity and does not mis-
lead; (2) whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial; (3) if
the first two parts yield positive answers, whether the regulation directly
advances the asserted governmental interest; and (4) whether the regula-
tion is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.5 4 The
Court ultimately invalidated the ban because the regulation did not di-
rectly advance the state's interest in energy conservation and the state
failed to show that the regulation was not more extensive than necessary
to serve the state's interest.5 The Court did little to clarify what speech
would be subject to this four-part analysis other than to define it as "ex-
pression[s] related solely to the economic interests of the speaker and
audience."
C. Mature Stage
Metromedia Inc. v. San Diego 6 marked the beginning of the more re-
flective stage of the doctrine's development and was an appropriate vehi-
cle for the Court to explain the differences between commercial and
noncommercial speech. San Diego had enacted an ordinance prohibiting
"outdoor advertising display signs."57 The city's stated purpose was "to
distinction of profit motive to justify the different results was most undesirable and unsupported by
earlier cases that had offered protection to speech despite a pecuniary motive. Id. at 471-74 (Mar.
shall, J., concurring).
51. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
52. Id. at 571-72.
53. Id. at 561.
54. Id. at 566.
55. Id. at 569-71.
56. 453 U.S. 490 (1981).
57. San Diego Ordinance No. 10795 (New Series, enacted March 14, 1972). The general prohi-
bition of the ordinance reads as follows:
OFF PREMISE OUTDOOR ADVERTISING DISPLAY SIGNS PROHIBITED
[Vol. 63:649
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eliminate hazards to pedestrians and motorists brought about by distract-
ing sign displays" and "to preserve and improve the appearance of the
city."58 The ordinance included a broad exception for onsight commer-
cial billboards but did not have a similar exception for noncommercial
messages. 9 While the Court applied the Central Hudson analysis and
decided that the city could differentiate between onsight and offsight
commercial messages,' the ordinance was held to be invalid because
Only those outdoor advertising display signs, hereinafter referred to as signs in this Divi-
sion, which are either signs designating the name of the owner or occupant of the premises
upon which such signs are placed, or identifying such premises; or signs advertising goods
manufactured or produced or services rendered on the premises upon which signs are
placed shall be permitted. The following signs shall be prohibited:
1. Any sign identifying a use, facility or service which is not located on the premises.
2. Any sign identifying a product which is not produced, sold or manufactured on the
premises.
3. Any sign which advertises or otherwise directs attention to a product, service or
activity, event, person, institution or business which may or may not be identified by a
brand name and which occurs or is generally conducted, sold, manufactured, produced or
offered elsewhere than on the premises where such sign is located.
58 See 453 U.S. at 493.
59 Section 101.0700(F) provides as follows:
The following types of signs shall be exempt from the provisions of these regulations:
1. Any sign erected and maintained pursuant to and in discharge of any governmental
function or required by any law, ordinance or governmental regulation.
2. Bench signs located at designated public transit bus stops; provided, however, that
such signs shall have any necessary permits required by Sections 62.0501 and 62.0502 of
this Code.
3. Signs being manufactured, transported and/or stored within the City limits of the
City of San Diego shall be exempt; provided, however, that such signs are not used, in any
manner or form, for purposes of advertising at the place or places of manufacture or stor-
age.
4. Commemmorative plaques of recognized historical societies and organizations.
5. Religious symbols, legal holiday decorations and identification emblems of religious
orders or historical societies.
6. Signs located within malls, courts, arcades, porches, patios and similar areas where
such signs are not visible from any point on the boundary of the premises.
7. Signs designating the premises for sale, rent or lease; provided, however, that any
such sign shall conform to all regulations of the particular zone in which it is located.
8. Public service signs limited to the depiction of time, temperature or news; provided,
however, that any such sign shall conform to all regulations of the particular zone in which
it is located.
9. Signs on vehicles regulated by the City that provide public transportation including,
but not limited to, buses and taxicabs.
10. Signs on licensed commercial vehicles, including trailers; provided, however, that
such vehicles shall not be utilized as parked or stationary outdoor display signs.
11. Temporary off-premises subdivision directional signs if permitted by a conditional
use permit granted by the Zoning Administrator.
12. Temporary political campaign signs, including their supporting structures, which
are erected or maintained for no longer than 90 days and which are removed within 10
days after election to which they pertain.
60. See 453 U.S. at 507-12.
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there was an exception for onsight commercial messages and no similar
provision for noncommercial messages. 6
1
Although the Court did not discuss the actual differences between
commercial and noncommercial speech, it cited Justice Stewart's concur-
rence in Virginia Pharmacy.62 In that concurrence Justice Stewart differ-
entiated commercial from noncommercial speech on the basis of
ideological content,63 defining ideological expression as "thought that
may shape our concepts of the whole universe of man." 6 Justice Stewart
concluded that there is no "ideological expression" in commercial speech
because the speech is confined only to the promotion of goods and
services.65
Justice Brennan's concurrence in Metromedia signals the beginning of
the maturation process of the commercial speech doctrine. He expressed
concern with the majority opinion that permitted the ban on commercial
billboards. He was particularly displeased that governmental officials
would be permitted to decide what constitutes commercial speech. 66 To-
gether, the citation to Justice Stewart's earlier thoughts and Justice Bren-
nan's concurrence provide some substance for inquiry into the reasons
for classifying some speech as commercial.
Bolger v. Youngs Drugs Product Corp. 67 is one of the Court's most re-
cent attempts to differentiate commercial from noncommercial speech.
Bolger involved a wholesaler's challenge to a federal statute prohibiting
61. Id. at 513-21.
62. Id. at 505. See supra note 15.
63. Id. See also Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 779 (Stewart, J., concurring).
64. Id
65. Id.
66. 453 U.S. at 538 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan offered the following warning:
I would be unhappy to see city officials dealing with the following series of billboards
and deciding which ones to permit: the first billboard contains the message "Visit Joe's Ice
Cream Shoppe"; the second, "Joe's Ice Cream Shoppe uses only the highest quality dairy
products"; the third, "Because Joe thinks that dairy products are good for you, please shop
at Joe's Shoppe"; and the fourth, "Joe says to support dairy price products; they mean
lower prices for you at his Shoppe."
Id.
Justice Brennan suggested other troublesome examples in determining what is commercial speech:
a billboard by San Diego Padre fans not connected to the team that reads, "Support the
San Diego Padres; a great baseball team"; one by the United Auto Workers that reads, "Be
a patriot--do not buy Japanese manufactured cars"; the same billboard offered by
Chrysler, "Support America's First Environment Strike. Don't Buy Shell!" paid for by the
Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers International Union of the AFL-CIO and the same
billboard paid for by Exxon.
Id at 538-39 & n.14.
67. 463 U.S. 60 (1983).
[Vol. 63:649
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unsolicited mailing of contraceptive advertisements.6" The manufacturer
sought to mail three types of materials on an unsolicited basis:
(1) multipage, multi-item flyers promoting a large variety of products
available at a drug store, including prophylactics;
(2) flyers exclusively or substantially devoted to promoting prophylactics;
and
(3) informational pamphlets discussing the desirability and availability of
prophylactics in general or of Youngs' products in particular.
The Postal Service had warned the wholesaler that these mailings would
violate the statute. The Supreme Court ultimately held that the statute
was unconstitutional.69
While the Court concluded that most of the mailings fell within the
"core notion" of commercial speech-speech that does no more than
propose a commercial transaction-the Court conceded that the infor-
mational pamphlets also discussed important public issues.70 Thus, the
Court had to determine how the pamphlets should be characterized. In
determining whether the pamphlets were commercial, the Court focused
on the "core notion" and three additional factors:71 (1) whether the ma-
terial was advertising; (2) whether there were references to specific prod-
ucts; and (3) whether there was an economic motivation.72
Justice Stevens in his concurrence voiced concern about the Court's
reliance on these factors to characterize the speech because of the diffi-
68. 39 U.S.C. § 3001(e)(2) provides:
Any unsolicited advertisement of matter which is designed, adapted, or intended for
preventing conception is nonmailable matter, shall not be carried or delivered by mail, and
shall be disposed of as the Postal Service directs unless the advertisement-
(A) is mailed to a manufacturer of such matter, a dealer therein, a licensed physi-
cian or surgeon, or a nurse, pharmacist, druggist, hospital, or clinic; or
(B) accompanies in the same parcel any unsolicited sample excepted by paragraph
(1) of this subsection.
An advertisement shall not be deemed to be unsolicited for the purpose of this paragraph if
it is contained in a publication for which the addressee has paid or promised to pay a
consideration or which he has otherwise indicated he desires to receive.
Section 3001(e)(a) provides as follows:
Any matter which is unsolicited by the addressee and which is designed, adapted, or
intended for preventing conception (except unsolicited samples thereof mailed to a manu-
facturer thereof, a dealer therein, a licensed physician or surgeon, or a nurse, pharmacist,
druggist, hospital, or clinic) is nonmailable matter, shall not be carried or delivered by
mail, and shall be disposed of as the Postal Service directs.
69. 463 U.S. at 67.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
Number 4]
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culty in differentiating commercial from noncommercial speech.7 3 He
concluded that "[b]ecause significant speech so often comprises both
commercial and noncommercial elements it may be more fruitful to focus
on the nature of the challenged regulation rather than the proper label
for the communication."'74
It is apparent that even in the Court's later stage of exploration of the
limits of the commercial speech doctrine, there is very little substance
other than the establishment of the doctrine. The question then is what
normative concerns underlie the doctrine applied in these commercial
speech cases.
II. NORMATIVE VALUES: SMALL HINTS AND LARGE INFERENCES
Chrestensen's casual treatment of speech containing noncommercial as
well as commercial ideas seems to suggest that first amendment protec-
tion of commercial speech is meritless. This is apparent in Chrestensen's
rather short-order treatment of the issue despite the fact that it had never
before been decided. Also, there is no indication in the opinion that
commercial speech had any constitutional dignity, much less any
protection.
Although the Supreme Court has modified its approach to the issue,
such scholars as Professor Bork75 and Professors Jackson and Jeffries 76
have suggested that commercial speech is valueless. Professor Bork ar-
gues that some rights are derived rather than explicit.77 These derivative
rights are no less fundamental or important by virtue of their origin than
express rights, but because they are derived, they are limited in scope.78
Thus the freedoms of speech and press, while express, are not explicit
and their scope is derived from the Constitution as a whole.79 Thus, to
Professor Bork, freedom of expression only protects speech necessary to
the political process as the constitutional republican form of government
established. 0 Professor Bork's approach, therefore, leaves unprotected
speech in the areas of science, literature, and the arts, and, by inference,
73. Id. at 81.
74. Id at 82.
75. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971).
76. Jackson & Jeffries, Commercial Speech: Economic Due Process and the First Amendment,
65 VA. L. REv. 1 (1979).
77. Bork, supra note 75, at 20.
78. Id. at 21-35.
79. Id. at 23.
80. Id. at 20.
[Vol. 63:649
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol63/iss4/3
COMMERCIAL SPEECH
commercial speech."'
Professors Jackson and Jeffries have also suggested that the first
amendment does not protect commercial speech.82 They argue that free
speech embodies two values rather than one. Free speech furthers the
democratic process of self-government by providing information needed
to make political decisions. It also contributes to greater individual self-
fulfillment, which makes citizens more capable of deciding issues of self-
government. 83 They conclude that commercial speech provides no infor-
mation relevant to political matters.84 They would reject Virginia Phar-
macy's implicit holding that advertising provides information useful in
making enlightened decisions on policy and policy-makers.85 They rely,
however, on Virginia Pharmacy as conclusive authority for the proposi-
tion that commercial speech does not promote self-realization. 6 Their
thesis is that the commercial speech doctrine is a judicial reinstatement
of economic regulation in the guise of enforcement of first amendment
values. Although their reasons for excluding commercial speech from
protection are arguable, there is merit in their ultimate conclusion.
Two pairs of cases illustrate how the lack of articulated normative val-
ues can lead Professors Jackson and Jeffries to conclude that the com-
mercial speech doctrine represents an illegitimate reintroduction of ideas
of economic regulation. The first couplet is Bigelow v. Virginia 8 7 com-
pared with Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp."8 In Bigelow, the de-
fendant was charged with violating Virginia law by publishing an
advertisement of a New York abortion referral service.8 9 The subject of
81. Id at 20, 27.
82. Jackson & Jeffries, supra note 76, at 6.
83. Id. at 5.
84. Id.
85, See Virginia Pharmacy, 428 U.S. at 765.
86. See Jackson & Jeffries, supra note 76, at 5.
87. 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
88. 463 U.S. 60 (1983).
89. The advertisement read as follows:
UNWANTED PREGNANCY
LET US HELP YOU
Abortions are now legal in New York.
There are no residency requirements.
FOR IMMEDIATE PLACEMENT IN ACCREDITED
HOSPITALS AND CLINICS AT LOW COST
Contact
WOMEN'S PAVILION
515 Madison Avenue
New York, N.Y. 10022
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the advertisement was undeniably controversial and a matter of great
public concern.90 Nonetheless, it cannot be argued that it was anything
more than an advertisement of a service for a price. 91 None of the adver-
tisement's space was allocated to explaining New York's laws or to criti-
cism of Virginia's laws prohibiting abortion.92 In fact, given the nature
of the business advertised, it was probably in the agency's financial inter-
est that states neighboring New York continued to prohibit abortions so
that the agency could draw prospective customers from those states.
Had abortions been more available, it is likely that there would have been
little need for the agency's commercial service.
If the Court's reasoning was that a mundane solicitation to enter into a
commercial transaction became valuable speech because the transaction
was one of controversy, then the same protection must logically be given
to advertisements for the sale of Chrysler automobiles because of the role
that the federal government played in ensuring that the corporation con-
tinued in business. It is more likely, as Professor Schiro suggests, that
the Court wished to emphasize the importance of the right to abortions. 93
If this is so, the Court should have set forth its reasoning that the subject
matter made the advertisement less subject to restrictive regulations.
The Court may have been concerned that upholding the conviction
would undermine its recent decision making access to abortions a funda-
mental right.94 The Court, however, wrapped its decision in the rhetoric
of the first amendment and held that Virginia had no legitimate state
interest sufficient to restrict the flow of information about a service that
was legal in another state.95 The articulated reason should have been
that Virginia had no legitimate interest sufficient to prevent dissemina-
tion of information about the exercise of a fundamental right. The Court
did not need to declare unconstitutional Virginia's attempt to limit dis-
cussion about the availability of the service. The Court should have fo-
or call any time
(212) 371-6670 or (212) 371-6650
AVAILABLE 7 DAYS A WEEK
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL. We will make
all arrangements for you and help you
with information and counseling.
Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 812.
90. See Comment, supra note 4, at 1029.
91. But see id.
92. See Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 811-12.
93. Schiro, Commercial Speech: The Demise of a Chimera, 1976 Sup. Cr. REV. 45, 78 (1976).
94. See id.
95. Bigelow. 421 U.S. at 827-29.
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cused on the restricted subject matter, rather than the illegitimacy of
restricting information about services available elsewhere. The opinion
thus ignores the state's legitimate interest in prohibiting commercial
speech concerning unlawful activity, an interest that the Court has else-
where recognized.96 More consideration should have been given to the
basis for invalidating the law before simply concluding that the speech
was of fundamental importance, protected, and not commercial.
97
Youngs9" makes the decision in Bigelow appear even less founded on
consistent normative values of the first amendment. The pamphlets in
Youngs were not all within the Court's "core notion" of commercial
speech because they did more than merely "propose a commercial trans-
action." 99 Both pamphlets provided information about condoms, one
with and one without specific reference to the brands manufactured by
Youngs, and described the advantages of each."° Both flyers discussed
the important social issues of veneral disease and birth control. 1 ' Thus,
the pamphlets cannot be characterized as mere proposals to enter into a
commercial transaction. 102 The Court held that the combination of ad-
vertising, specific product references, and the economic motivation for
mailing the pamphlets supported the district court's conclusion of com-
merciality.'0 3 Notwithstanding the fact that the pamphlets discussed im-
portant social issues, the Court concluded the mailings were commercial
speech.'0 4
Applying all three of these factors to the speech in Bigelow, the Court
should have reached the same conclusion. In fact the Bigelow ad did not
discuss the underlying issues of abortion and birth control; it merely pro-
posed that readers take advantage of the service if they wished. The re-
ferral agency was mentioned by name and the agency had an economic
interest in responses to the ad. 105
A significant issue is what effect the importance of the issues has on the
96. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564; Bates, 433 U.S. at 384; Pittsburgh Press Co., 413 U.S. at
388.
97. Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 822.
98. 463 U.S. at 66-67.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 66 n.13; Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563.
101. 463 U.S. at 66-68.
102. Id. These ads were not within the "core notion" of commercial speech, which is advertise-
ment of commercial services or goods.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. See supra note 89.
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Court's determination of commerciality. In Youngs hints exist in the
portion of the opinion devoted to a better explanation of its commercial-
ity test.10 6 The Court, however, makes no attempt to distinguish Bigelow
from Youngs, because it was able to strike the regulations as impermissi-
ble restrictions without reaching the commerciality issue. The Court,
however, could have applied the line of reasoning to Youngs to conclude
that the pamphlets did not constitute commercial speech. The opinion
leaves the question of what force and effect the rhetoric of commerciality
in Youngs will have. The effect of Youngs has to be that the commercial
speech doctrine is a substantial and viable tool in providing varied levels
of protection to speech on the basis of some unarticulated normative
value.
The second couplet of cases is In re Primus'017 and Ohralik v. Ohio Bar
Association.08 Despite the Court's general statement that profit motive
alone is not determinative of protection, these cases suggest that profit
motive is important in determining the relative value of the
communication.
In Primus the Supreme Court emphasized that the solicitation was not
for pecuniary gain and the letter was within the first amendment's pro-
tection of association, and was intended to further the social and political
aims of the ACLU rather than any financial interest.109 The Court ad-
dressed associational and free expression rights interchangeable without
any distinction of why profit motivated activities cannot be a legitimate
reason for promoting expression among those persons with similar
interests. 110
In Ohralik, the Court relied on the pecuniary interest of Ohralik to
justify upholding the disciplinary action taken against him for having
solicited two young women injured in an automobile accident.I' Justice
Marshall, in his concurrence, pointed out that reliance on the profit mo-
tive distinction to justify the different results was dangerous and unjusti-
fied.'1 2 It seems inappropriate and inconsistent for the Court to focus on
the profit motive of the speaker to justify regulation in this situation
when all previous cases stated that this factor alone would not be deter-
106. See Bolger, 463 U.S. at 67 n.14.
107. 436 U.S. 412 (1978).
108. 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
109. 436 U.S. at 422, 431-32.
110. Id. at 431-34.
111. 436 U.S. at 457-59.
112. Id. at 471-74 (Marshall, J., concurring).
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minative of protection. It can be argued that this was a different way of
articulating the Court's acceptance of the compelling state interest in
preventing the evils of overreaching, undue influence and invasion of pri-
vacy.I13 This, however, ignores the question of why the Court so readily
views these evils in a solicitation prompted by profit but not where the
motive is altruistic. The possibility exists that a politically motivated and
highly committed lawyer would overreach, exert undue influence, and
invade the privacy of a potential client to further the desired political or
social goal.
Ohralik and Primus suggest that contrary to the language of the cases
the Courts' evaluation of the speech in question does assign a primary
role to profit motive. Again, this is neither unsupportable nor bad. The
Court itself has provided support and justification for this position. In
Virginia Pharmacy the Court stated that commercial speech is distin-
guishable from other types of speech, and recognized commonsense dif-
ferences between speech that does no more than propose a commercial
transaction and other varieties.'"4 Most importantly commercial speech
while not provably false may be misleading. The state can regulate com-
mercial speech to ensure that commerce "flow[s] cleanly as well as
freely.""' 5 Power to regulate commercial speech was said to be a func-
tion of the greater ability to ascertain the truthfulness of commercial
speech as opposed to political commentary on news reporting." 6 This
claim, however, seems unsupportable as a general proposition.
Consider the ability to determine the truth of these two statements.
"Our facial cream is good for your skin." "The MX missile is a waste of
taxpayers dollars and I have voted against it every time." The second
statement is more readily verifiable as true than the puffing of a manufac-
turer in this specific instance. Not all commercial speech, however, is
less readily verifiable than political statements. Verifiability will depend
more on the type of statement made and its circumstances than on its
subject matter.
The early test of commerciality indicates the Court's intention,
although it was quickly obscured. Had the test of a speech's commercial-
ity remained whether the speech did "no more than propose a commer-
113. Id. at 461-62.
114. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771 n.24.
115. Id. at 771-72.
116. Id. at 771-72 n.24.
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cial transaction"11 7 it might have been possible to draw the "line of
commerciality" by analogy to what constitutes an offer for purposes of
contract law. The Court might then have accepted analyses such as Pro-
fessor Farber's that regulation of commercial speech be justified as an
adjunct to regulation of the "act" of contract formation.' 1 8
The court instead has not explicitly asserted a contract formation anal-
ysis and thus from the beginning has fostered confusion in its ambiguous
rationale for greater regulation. In Virginia Pharmacy, the Court also
suggested that commercial speech is more durable and not likely to be
chilled because it is virtually indispensable to profits in our commercial
world.1 19 This seems to be a very different proposition from the "objec-
tivity" of mere proposals for commercial transactions and suggests that a
broader range of speech could be regulated.
As previously indicated the demonstrability of truth or falsity is not
necessarily greater in political speech than in commercial speech. The
same is true as to indicia of hardiness. More important than the category
of speech in question is the specific setting of the speech. In Primus,'20
the defendant did nothing more than solicit the representation of cli-
ents.'21 Although there was no expectation of profit, in that setting there
were indicia of durability and hardiness of the speech that rivaled those
in commercial speech. There is a likelihood of strong commitment to
purpose that would increase the likelihood of attempts to communicate
the message despite regulation. Furthermore, while no direct reward
could be received from the clients it must have been apparent that funds,
either government or private, for the legal aid office would not be avail-
able absent some tangible benefit to society. The opportunity to demon-
strate the need for low cost or free legal aid in a situation that begs for
remedy, both from an individual and societal stand-point, could be a
strong influence on the speaker, the possibility of regulation would not
easily chill.
Bates added two additional "common sense differences" between non-
117. Id.
118. See Farber, Commercial Speech and First Amendment Theory, 74 Nw. U.L. REV. 372
(1979). Cf Bolger, 463 U.S. at 81 (Stevens, J., concurring) (at least one member of the Court
suggests a search for first amendment values and further proposes that the Court focus on the nature
of the regulation and not whether speech is or is not commercial).
119. 425 U.S. at 772 n.24.
120. 436 U.S. 412 (1978).
121. Id. See also supra note 15.
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commercial and commercial speech. 122 The Court suggested that any
concern for great accuracy inhibiting spontaneity is lessened by the cal-
culated nature of most commercial speech. Again, this is an observation
which is equally true of noncommercial speech not offered in the heat of
an argument or without reflection. If calculation offsets protection, then
reduced protection should be afforded all types of speech that are "calcu-
lated." An additional distinction between all commercial advertising and
noncommercial speech that the Bates Court offered is that the benefits of
commercial speech, particularly information, are dependent on the
speech being truthful and not misleading.'23
This is the first step of a return to Chrestensen.'24 For the Court to
assert that commercial speech has as its primary benefit the provision of
truthful and nonmisleading information assumes that the act of commu-
nication or the receipt of information, even false information, is not of
value, although it is in the "marketplace" of political or social ideas
where truth competes with falsehood. This reasoning implies commer-
cial speech is inherently lacking and of lesser constitutional dignity.
These cases, and the commonsense differences are grounded on no ar-
ticulated value that sets commercial speech apart from noncommercial
speech. Although there are hints of underlying values, these implicit val-
ues are often inconsistent and directly conflicting. The Court should not
assert that commercial speech is valuable primarily because it provides
information, but reject the same argument in support of decreased pro-
tection for noncommercial speech unless commercial matters are inher-
ently less valuable or constitutionally less dignified. In rejecting this
characterization the Court in Virginia Pharmacy correctly indicated the
vast importance of commercial information in our everyday lives.125
Our society attaches substantial importance to diet, health, and lifes-
122. 433 U.S. at 380-83. See also infra notes 245-49 and accompanying text.
123. 433 U.S. at 380-83. The third distinction that Bates added applies peculiarly to advertising
of legal services. The Court stated:
because the public lacks sophistication concerning legal services, misstatements that might
be overlooked or deemed unimportant in other advertising may be found quite inappropri-
ate in legal advertising. For example, advertising claims as to the quality of services... are
not susceptible of measurement or verification... similar objections might justify restraints
on in-person solicitation.
Id. at 383-84.
124, 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
125. 425 U.S. at 765.
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tyle while fewer than 55 percent 126 of the eligible adults participate in
important political decisions. It may well be that to highly educated
adults it is easy to say political decisions and information about those
decisions are more significant. Although individually insignificant, more
time is spent with mundane decisions that are largely based on commer-
cial messages. There is substantial room for differing opinions as to the
relative importance of information. Absent an explicit hierarchical rank-
ing of subject matters in the Constitution, the Court will impose one
where necessary to decide questions presented to it. These decisions
should be made with concern and deference for individuality and should
be made on the basis of articulated values which then can be used to
structure future transactions and exercises of freedom.
What then are the values which may be inferred from the opinions in
existence. The Court seems to lack consensus as to the normative value
underlying continuation of the commercial speech doctrine. The cases
indicate shifting and situational justifications for the commercial speech
category, which stem, at least in part, from an inadequately articulated
prejudice against commercial speech. The Court believes that commer-
cial speech is hardy, and unlikely to suffer from the chilling affect of
statutory restrictions. 127 It is also more mundane, of lesser constitutional
dignity than noncommercial or ideological speech. 128 This undercurrent
of prejudice however, is not monolithic.1 29
The Court's holdings, tests and dicta are subject to many different in-
126. Instead of 100 million voters participating in the presidential election, as the Demo-
crats had hoped, unofficial vote totals indicated that about 90 million people voted. That
figure is expected to increase to 92 or 93 million when absentee ballots and third-party and
write-in voters are tabulated. That vote total would be large enough to end the 20-year
decline in the presidential-year voter turnout rate, which slumped to 52.6 percent of the
voting age population in 1980.
Elections '84: Decisive Vote, Divided Outcome, Congressional Quarterly Guide to Current Ameri-
can Government (Spring 1985).
127. See Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 381-83 (1977); Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at
564 n.6; Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771 n.24.
128. See Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 506 (1981) (quoting Ohralik); Central
Hudson, 447 U.S. at 562-63 n.5.
129. Consider the following almost lyrical praise offered in Virginia Pharmacy:
Focusing first on the individual parties to the transaction that is proposed in the com-
mercial advertisement, we assume that the advertiser's interest is a purely economic one.
This hardly disqualifies him from protection under the First Amendment. The interests of
the contestants in a labor dispute are primarily economic, but it has long been settled that
both the employee and the employer are protected by the First Amendment when they
express themselves on the merits of the dispute in order to influence its outcome .... A
single factory may have economic repercussions upon a whole region and affect wide
spread systems of marketing. Since the facts of such a 'single factory' could as well turn on
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terpretations, and support a variety of normative values. These values
range from Judge Bork's 3° assertion that nonpolitical speech should not
be protected to Professor Redish's belief that it must be fully protected
because there are salutary values present in the communication and re-
ceipt of even commercial speech.t Beginning with the premise that
there are a number of valid, yet competing normative values this article
proposes that the Court should begin to explore the underlying norma-
its ability to advertise its product as on the resolution of its labor difficulties, we see no
satisfactory distinction between the two kinds of speech.
As to the particular consumer's interest in the free flow of commercial information, that
interest may be as keen, if not keener by far, than his interest in the day's most urgent
political debate... those whom the suppression of prescription drug information hits the
hardest are the poor, the sick, and particularly the aged. A disproportionate amount of
their income tends to be spent on prescription drugs; yet they are the least able to learn, by
shopping from pharmacist to pharmacist, where their scarce dollars are best spent. When
drug prices vary as strikingly as they do, information as to whom is charging what becomes
more than a convenience. It could mean the alleviation of physical pain or the enjoyment
of basic necessities.
425 U.S. at 762-64.
130. Bork, supra note 75, at 28.
131. Professor Redish defines the "freedom of self-realization" as the "freedom to act as one
wishes for the sake of the good as he sees it has been labeled by a modern restatement of liberty."
After review of Mr. Meiklejohn's theory of self-government that only protects political and nonpri-
vate speech, Professor Redish concludes that the underlying values of private and public speech are
the same. He reasons that,
[t]o acknowledge the importance of political self-government is effectively to concede the
value of private self-government as well. If society holds as valuable the ability of the
individuals as members of society to attain their collective goals, the same principle would
seem to place a similar value on the ability of the individual as an individual to determine
and achieve his personal goals for a satisfactory life-style as long as those goals do not
significantly and unduly interfere with the interests of others .... First Amendment the-
ory has long recognized that the way for individuals to reach the best possible decisions in
the public sphere is by encouraging free and open discussion and a competitive exchange of
ideas .... Thus the optimum course can be decided upon only after all alternatives are
considered and the final judgment tested by exposure to opposing facts or opinions. This
mode of analysis which dictates the importance of the first amendment in the political
sphere applies in an intensified state to decisions which affect the individual alone or as a
member of a family....
Redish, The First Amendment in the Market Place: Commercial Speech and the Values of Free
Expression, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 429, 442 (1971).
The task of setting out the competing normative values has been done elsewhere. Rather than
repeat a discussion with which most readers in this area will be familiar, it is suggested to those
interested in greater detail that they begin with the sources discussed in these prior works. See
Barnes, Unlawful Commercial Speech, supra note 5, at 458-64; Barnes, Regulations of Speech In-
tended to Affect Behavior, 63 Den. L.J. 1 (1985). From these scholars' works we can develop a range
of values against which to test the Court's opinions. There is no need to redo what others such as
Professors Baker, Commercial Speech: A Problem in the Theory of Freedom, 62 IOWA L. REV. 1
(1976), Redish, supra note 131, at 429, Shiffrin, The First Amendment and Economic Regulation:
Away From a General Theory of the First Amendment, 73 Nw. U.L. REv. 1212 (1984) and Baker
have done.
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tive values supporting the commercial speech doctrine before attempting
to define commercial speech. This is necessary because enunciation of
the values can help shape the test of commerciality so that it reflects
these values rather than the particular fact situation.
Three possible values have so far emerged. If there is a genuine dis-
tinction between commercial and noncommercial on the basis that com-
mercial matters are less valuable to society and constitutionally less
dignified than ideological speech, then an objective test such as product
or brand identification is best suited to establishing commerciality. If a
choice is made from the other end of the value scale and commercial
speech is to be fully protected then no test is necessary. Case law indi-
cates, however, that the Court will focus on neither extreme and the
value of commercial speech will be found somewhere in the middle. If,
as Professor Farber has suggested, regulation is related to the contract
formation function of commercial speech, then a test which focuses on
this factor would be appropriate. 32 This middle range leaves open other
possibilities. Suppose the Court rejects Professor Farber's analysis be-
cause it fails to explain why contract formation makes speech less pro-
tected. Should the Court still wish to permit regulation of commerce
because it falls within the traditional state realm, 33 the Court could re-
turn to the value of commercial speech being inherent in its mere propo-
sal of a commercial transaction. 134
132. Farber, supra note 118, at 386-98. See also Youngs, 463 U.S. at 83 (Stevens, J., concurring).
133. Farber, supra note 118, at 387.
134. In concluding that commercial speech enjoys First Amendment protection, we have
not held that it is wholly undifferentiable from other forms. There are commonsense differ-
ences between speech that does "no more than propose a commercial transaction," Pitts-
burgh Press Co. v. Human Relations Comm'n, 413 U.S., [sic] at 385, and other varities.
Even if the differences do not justify the conclusion that commercial speech is valueless,
and thus subject to complete suppression by the State, they nonetheless suggest that a
different degree of protection is necessary to insure that the flow of truthful and legitimate
commercial information is unimpaired. The truth of commercial speech, for example, may
be more easily verifiable by its disseminator than, let us say, news reporting or political
commentary, in that ordinarily the advertiser seeks to disseminate information about a
specific product or service that he himself provides and presumably knows more about
than anyone else. Also, commercial speech may be more durable than other kinds. Since
advertising is the sine qua non of commercial profits, there is little likelihood of its being
chilled by proper regulation and foregone entirely.
Attributes such as these, the greater objectivity and hardiness of commercial speech may
make it less necessary to tolerate inaccurate statements for fear of silencing the speaker.
Compare New York Times Co. v. Sullivan 376 U.S. 254 (1964) with Dun & Bradstreet, Inc.
v. Grove 404 U.S. 898 (1971). They may also make it appropriate to require that a com-
mercial message appear in such a form, or include such additional information, warnings,
and disclaimers, as are necessary to prevent its being deceptive. Compare Miami Herald
Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974), with Banzhaf v. FCC, 132 U.S. App. D.C.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol63/iss4/3
COMMERCIAL SPEECH
This Article focuses on the intermediate range of values leading the
Court to offer limited, but not complete protection. It also addresses the
objective test appropriate to the value dictating no protection. Despite
the Court's rejection of this objective in Virginia Pharmacy it continues
to be a theme with those who would argue that there is no need to pro-
tect commercial speech. With this premise comes the concomitant need
to differentiate between commercial and noncommercial speech.
III. WHY NORMATIVE VALUES SHOULD DICTATE
THE TEST OF COMMERCIALITY
Early case law defined commercial speech as that which "does no
more than propose a commercial transaction" definition.' 35 In Youngs
the Court described this definition as "the core notion of commercial
speech" and went on to list the three factors-profit motive, mention of
product or brand by name and the advertising nature of the speech-
which support the conclusion of commerciality. 136 Because the mailings
in Youngs did more than merely propose a commercial transaction, they
were not within the core notion of commercial speech.' 37 Had they been
within this core notion, the Court would not have looked at other fac-
tors. These three factors thus give some indication of when commercial
speech exceeds mere contractual offers or solicitations for a commercial
transaction. In essence the category includes speech which contains dis-
cussions of public issues and links the product to current public debate,
because this additional material is insufficient to raise the speech to the
level of noncommercial, ideological speech.138 The Youngs definition
14, 405 F.2d 1082 (1968), cert. denied sub nom. Tobacco Institute, Inc. v. FCC, 396 U.S.
842 (1969). Cf. United States v. 95 Barrels of Vinegar, 265 U.S. 438, 443 (1924) ("It is not
difficult to choose statements, designs and devices which will not deceive"). They may also
make inapplicable the prohibition against prior restraints. Compare New York Times Co.
v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971), with Donaldson v. Read Magazine, 333 U.S. 178,
189-191 (1948); FTC v. Standard Education Society, 302 U.S. 112 (1937); E.F. Drew &
Co. v. FTC, 235 F.2d 735, 739-740 (CA2 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 969 (1957).
Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771-72 n.24.
This proposal could come from third parties who would not be parties to the actual contract and
would necessitate a subjective test of whether the speaker intended to promote a commercial transac-
tion. The difference between this approach and Professor Farber's approach would be to treat some
third party speech as commercial when the third parties who promoted the transaction were not
parties to the contract itself. See Farber, supra note 118, at 388-89.
135. See supra notes 15-87 & 134 and accompanying text.
136. Youngs, 463 U.S. at 66.
137. Id.
138 Id. at 66-67.
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seemingly implicates no new value, but is an extension of the earlier defi-
nition. This is apparent from the Court's discussion of why the extension
was necessary. Advertisers would be able to immunize false or mislead-
ing product information from regulation by including references to issues
of public concern or controversy. 139 Absent the relation to an activity
protected from governmental regulation, the pamphlets discussing con-
traceptives were valuable only because of the substantial societal and in-
dividual interest in information about the commercial product.140 This is
the same interest and value the Court identified in Virginia Pharmacy as
the reason for granting some protection to commercial speech. Society
and the individual want to assure the availability of information about
commercial activities which the state seeks to regulate. 141 When the in-
formation concerns unlawful transactions, or is untruthful or misleading,
then it has no constitutional value.' 42
If the purpose of the commercial speech doctrine is to protect the ex-
change of commercial information, speech essentially devoid of this valu-
able information will not be protected. In other words, when it is
untruthful or misleading, there is neither societal nor individual interest
in its communication. As a complementary concept, regulation is per-
mitted when it is designed to ensure the truthfulness, legality and other
factors which generate the value of the speech. 143 The unarticulated
complementary value seems to permit the exchange of even mundane
price quotations as in Virginia Pharmacy and Bates because that informa-
tion is helpful to consumers. The Court thus seems to have substituted
its judgment for that of the state legislature. The Court has decided
when to strike the balance between information and paternalistic protec-
tion in order to achieve better quality goods and services and to prevent
deception in commercial transactions.
In Bates the Court spent considerable time destroying each rationale
the state offered to support the ban on lawyer advertising. In large part
the Court's argument rested on its own judgment that the benefits of
advertising outweigh the harms of advertising. The Court did not de-
clare the state's concerns unfounded; 14 rather it found that a ban on
139. Id. at 67.
140. Id.
141. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 763-64.
142. Id. at 770-73. Bates, 433 U.S. at 383-84.
143. See Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771-72.
144. The possible exception is rejection of the justification that there will be undesirable eco-
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advertising was not the best response to state concerns.145 In summary,
despite a rational connection between the regulation and at least some
compelling regulatory goals, advertising is protected speech. The Court,
however, does permit the regulation of some advertising. The regulation
is more complex than the imposition of judicial values as to the relative
merits of various forms of advertising. All advertising of the classic solic-
itation type receives this limited protection; it is lost only when it con-
fronts a substantial state interest. To lose this protection, the state
regulation must directly advance the state interest and be no more exten-
sive than necessary to achieve its goals. 146 Commercial speech is pro-
tected not for values inherent in the message or communication of the
message, but for its informational function. The informational function
can be as broad as informing the listener about the market place or as
narrow as providing price information. 47 When the information is re-
moved, the speech should no longer be protected.1 48
As a result of the Court's common sense differences between commer-
cial and noncommercial speech, most cases requiring a definition of com-
mercial speech have been cases by or against advertisers of goods or
services. Metromedia Inc. v. San Diego 149 appears to be the only case
decided to date in which the Court did not consider a specific advertise-
ment or solicitation. Metromedia presented the Court with an ideal op-
portunity to define commercial speech more precisely. Instead, the
Court found the ordinance unconstitutional because of impermissible re-
strictions on noncommercial speech.15° It is not coincidental, then, that
when faced with the abstract concept of commerciality and with no con-
crete speech in question, the Court struggled with the definition of com-
merciality.' The lack of specificity in factual pattern raised concerns as
nomic results. Even here the Court has declared that the consideration is "unpersuasive." Bates,
433 U.S. at 378.
145. Id. at 379.
146. Youngs, 463 U.S. at 74-75; Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
147. Inherent in this argument is an unfortunate rejection of Professor Redish's suggestion of a
self-realization value in communication of all speech. The Court apparently believes that the com-
mercial speaker has only an economic interest. See Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 762. See also
supra note 132 and accompanying text.
148. See Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771-72.
149. 453 U.S. 490 (1981).
150. Id.
151. Id. at 536-37 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan did not specifically state that
judicial attempts at a definition are futile, but he did write that he was uncomfortable with the
Court's majority opinion, which would allow a banning of commercial billboards. He noted that his
discomfort arose in part because governmental officials would be permitted to decide what consti-
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to when the commercial speech doctrine would apply.'52 Should the
Court face a more direct test of its values than it avoided in Metromedia,
it would likely rely on the values announced in other commercial speech
cases. These elements are inferentially the protection of information and
the permissible regulation of commercial speech that rests on commercial
speech's dual value of information about a commercial transaction and
the concern for deference toward traditional state regulation. A proper
test might be an inquiry into whether the speaker reasonably expects the
speech to be regulated as an economic transaction as well as
communication.
The preliminary formulation of a test combines two values: economic
regulation of commerce and protection of the limited informational func-
tion about commerce. Perhaps economic due process requires protection
of commercial speech simply for its informational aspects. 153 By offering
this limited protection, the Court has not announced a first amendment
value based on normative concerns present in commercial speech that is
absent in other types of speech. The test would merely restate the con-
clusion that the interest in economic regulation of the commercial speech
is insufficient to override the economic interest in communicating the of-
fer. The Court, therefore, would have substituted one economic value for
another.
Professors Jackson and Jeffries have reached this conclusion.' 54 They
begin with a definition of commercial speech limited to business advertis-
ing. 5  To be protected, business advertising should advance one of the
recognized values supporting first amendment protection for speech.
When it neither provides information useful in the political process nor
effects individual self-realization,' 56 it falls outside the protection of the
tuted commercial speech. See also supra note 66 for Justice Brennan's examples of troublesome
billboards.
152. 453 U.S. at 536-37.
153. See Jackson & Jeffries, supra note 76, at 30-33.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 1.
156. Id. at 14-20. Professors Jackson and Jeffries are not willing to expand first amendment
protection to commercial speech to ensure full protection for speech that fostered these values but
that could conceivably be characterized as commercial. Linedrawing difficulty would not suffice as a
strategic reason for protection. One basis for an exception was accepted. "Conceivably, a difficulty
in linedrawing could become so intractable and pervasive as to render the distinction itself intracta-
ble." Id. at 19-20. Perhaps that point has been reached in Dun and Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Build.
ers, Inc. See infra notes 173-211 and accompanying text. The author is also not willing to concede
that this is the sole basis for giving up the task of linedrawing. If the normative concern that
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first amendment. Once the two liberty interests are absent, it is easy to
conclude that economic concerns dictated protection. Professors Jack-
son and Jeffries concede that the advertising ban in Virginia Pharmacy
was a classic example of special interest legislation. It was legislation
inconsistent with the common good of Virginia citizens; it forced out
competition and caused higher prices for prescription drugs. These dis-
advantages were not mitigated by any demonstrable contribution to pro-
fessionalism among pharmacists.1 57 The Court is thus criticizing the
economic judgment of the Virginia legislature. Criticism of this sort be-
longs to the political process and should not have been turned into a
constitutional challenge on first amendment grounds. 158
The Court's position, however, contains more than pure economic due
process. It is possible to rephrase the economic value of communication
about the transaction as one that expresses the fundamental speech value.
Although the Court has failed to do so, it is possible to start from the
premise that all speech is protected, but conduct is not. Regulation of
speech thus is permitted in such areas as criminal solicitation, conspir-
acy, and speech that has the force of action, because it is legitimate regu-
lation in an area of traditional state power which only tangentially
infringes freedom of expression.
Ignore the history of the commercial speech doctrine and ask whether
regulation of conduct such as misrepresentation, fraud or coercion would
be regulable despite the freedom of expression related to these activities.
The answer is obviously yes because these are areas within the state's
traditional exercise of its police power and which only tangentially in-
fringe on first amendment values. Commercial speech is not partially
protected because it concerns economic relations; rather it is fully pro-
tected, but subject to regulation when its character is more similar to
economic activity than economic speech.
This is similar to Professor Farber's analysis.159 What is different is
requires linedrawing cannot adequately be articulated to justify the distinction, the task of linedraw-
ing should be set aside until that is accomplished.
157. Jackson & Jeffries, supra note 76, at 30.
158. "In terms of constitutional values, price supports, minimum wage laws and advertising bans
are utterly indistinguishable." Id. at 33. Jackson and Jeffries argue that absent damage to the liberty
interest or the self-government interest, regulations of economic speech involve nothing more than
the harm found in any state regulation of economic activity in a free market system. To use this
"harm" as a basis for substituting the court's judgment on the proper resolution of the economic
issue is to review Lochner v. New York. Id.
159. What Professor Farber proposes is that the function of the language, not its content, be
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the route this Article takes to reach this conclusion and what implica-
tions it has for future development.' 60 As to the route taken, this Article
suggests the need to examine whether the commercial speech doctrine is
merely economic due process or is based on a fundamental value sup-
portive of full protection for commercial speech. Full protection is with-
held only because of the reality of the need to exercise traditional state
police powers. The implication for future development is in how the defi-
nition of commercial speech might reinforce this fundamental value.
Professors Jackson and Jeffries would conclude that no test is necessary
because the economic value of protecting commercial speech is an illegit-
imate reintroduction of economic due process. 6 ' Professor Farber sug-
analyzed. If it is informational, it should be protected, but if it is part of the contracting powers by
serving a contractual function, it may be regulated.
Similar to the language of a written contract, the language in advertising can be seen as
constituting part of seller's commitment to the buyer. Thus, advertising can function as
part of the contractual arrangement between the buyer and seller. Of course, in addition to
serving this contractual function, advertisements also serve an informative function to
which the first amendment applies. The critical factor seems to be whether a state rule is
based on the informative function or the contractual function of the language.
Farber, supra note 118, at 387.
160. In his proposed contractual framework, Professor Farber states:
The problem is to determine whether some justification exists for treating commercial
speech differently from other forms of speech. In other words, we are looking for some
distinctive attribute of commercial speech which explains its special treatment. If such a
distinction is found, we must determine what difference in constitutional protection it justi-
fies.
Economic motivation and subject matter have already been eliminated as distinguishing
factors. How else does commercial speech differ from noncommercial speech? One obvi-
ous distinction is that the commercial speaker not only talks about a product, but also sells
it. The sale itself is subject to broad state regulation. May such regulation include the
attachment of liability to the use of language in connection with a sales transaction?
To ask this question is very nearly to answer it. Contract law consists almost entirely of
rules attaching liability to various uses of language. For example the constitutional status
of an advertisement describing a product may be unclear, but the seller is obviously liable
for damages for the failure to deliver a product corresponding to the contract description.
No first amendment problem exists....
Similar to the language of a written contract, the language in advertising can be seen as
constituting part of the seller's commitment to the buyer. Thus, advertising can function
as part of the contractual arrangement between the buyer and seller. Of course, in addition
to serving this contractual function, advertisements also serve an informational function to
which the first amendment applies. The critical factor seems to be whether a state rule is
based on the informative function or the contractual function of the language. So long as a
regulation relates to the contractual function of the utterance, the regulation should not be
subjected to the intensive scrutiny required when a regulation directly implicates the first
amendment function of language. Thus, the problem is to devise a test which will distin-
guish between regulations involving the first amendment, informative aspects of advertising
and those involving its non-first amendment, contractual aspect.
Farber, supra note 118, at 386-87.
161. See Jackson & Jeffries, supra note 76, at 30-33.
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gests that it is unnecessary to focus on what is commercial speech at
all. 162 Obviously, this is essentially the same question and Professor Far-
ber's analysis has not answered it. The question is where to draw the line
between fully protected speech and less protected speech about economic
matters, regulable by virtue of its contract formation function.
If the normative value underlying protection of commercial speech is
the protection of all speech with informational value, then the category
of commercial speech is necessarily broad, encompassing virtually all ad-
vertising. If the normative value is protection of speech that does not
serve a contractual purpose, the category is less expansive because all
speech which is contractual is excluded from the category of fully pro-
tected informational speech. Speech having no contractual function, that
is, speech which may be economic in nature, but not part of the contrac-
tual process, should be protected. This is a negative inference drawn
from the police power of contract regulation. This appears to be Profes-
sor Farber's position. The inference this Article draws from the cases is
similar; the Court should eliminate more speech from the category of full
protection in deference to the traditional state police power in regulating
commerce. The value inferred here is broader, encompassing not only
contract formation but all aspects of speech that regulation of commerce
tangentially affects. Professor Farber limits the category of less protected
commercial speech to speech like advertising that is part of the contrac-
tual process. 163 When the inferred value of deference to regulation to
prevent economic harm is used, it allows broader regulation, including
regulation of third-party speech, that is, speech by someone other than
the parties to the contract.
Although this potentially broader regulation would not please those
who view the commercial speech doctrine as a good development, it
would be viewed as a better focus on the reason why commercial speech
is less protected. The reason may not be persuasive, but it is a more
normatively sound explanation than the distinction between contractual
and noncontractual language. There is not any apparent reason to offer
less protection to language of contract than to any other type of speech.
Limited protection is offered to commercial speech not because it is con-
tractual, but because protection is circumscribed by the need to accom-
modate a legitimate competing constitutional principle-the state's
162. See Farber, supra note 118, at 386-87.
163. Id.
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exercise of its police power to protect against harm. Although debatable,
this ordering of values is more solidly founded on articulated norms in-
ferred from prior Court opinions.
The Court should articulate norms that justify less protection than
that offered by the strict scrutiny test, 164 as has been the case in testing
inferences with noncommercial speech. 165 The Court should also justify
the lack of protection for commercial speech that is false, misleading or
about unlawful transactions when these limits are not imposed on non-
commercial speech. 166
The remainder of this Article is designed to aid those who view limited
protection as a necessity and who are willing to enunciate a normative
value supporting commercial speech which focuses on its informational
value and on the competing concern of deference to state regulation of
economic matters. The Court's present values protect the informational
function without undue hindrance of economic regulation. Rather than
suggest that this is a legitimate normative value, this Article simply rec-
ognizes that it appears to capsulize what the Court has done to date. The
balance of this Article makes clear that what is needed is a systematic
exploration of these inferential values to determine whether they are ade-
164. See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564. See also supra notes 15-87 and accompanying text for
development of the need for demonstration of present deficiency.
165. See Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 540 (1980). There
have been applications of the intermediate scrutiny test in contexts other than commercial speech.
See, eg., Seattle Times v. Rhinehart, 104 S. Ct. 2199 (1984). In Seattle Times, a leader of a religious
group brought an action for invasion of privacy and defamation against two Washington newspa-
pers. The newspapers had written numerous articles about the leader, and other members claimed
these stories were in part "fictional and untrue." During discovery, the newspapers requested cer-
tain membership and financial information that the group refused to provide. The trial court or-
dered the group to identify all donors who made contributions during the past five years and to
divulge enough membership information to substantiate any claims of diminished membership. The
court, however, also issued a protective order prohibiting the newspapers from publishing or using
the information in any way other than case preparation. The newspapers argued that this offended
the first amendment. The Supreme Court applied the two-part substantial interest test of whether
the "practice in question [furthers] an important or substantial government interest unrelated to the
suppression of expression" and "whether the limitation of First Amendment Freedoms [is) no
greater than is necessary or essential to the protection of the particular governmental interest in-
volved." Thus because the protective order regarding discovered information before trial was not a
classic prior restraint, it did not require "exacting" first amendment scrutiny. Protection of informa-
tion made available in the discovery process does not offend the first amendment. Id. at 2207-08.
See also Post, The Management of Speech: Discretion and the First Amendment in the Context of
Civil Discovery, 1984 Sup. Cr. REV. 169 (1985).
166. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol63/iss4/3
COMMERCIAL SPEECH
quate expressions of normative values which justify the commercial
speech doctrine.
The legitimate purpose of permitting state regulation of commercial
speech must be related to the prevention of substantive evils such as coer-
cion, fraud and deceit.167 If the regulation was not directed at misbehav-
ior and was directed more at a general distaste for commercial matters,
the Court could have left commercial speech unprotected. Because the
Court has accepted an informational value in commercial speech, it must
now establish at which point that informational value is subordinated to
prevent abuses from untruthful, misleading or unlawful information. As
a result, not all commercial speech needs to be subjected to regulation. It
is only that speech which presents these evils. These evils are not just
abstract evils; they are economic harms. They come about when the
speech results in the allocation of economic resources in a way the state
has determined to be inappropriate. An example is the sale of a car
which the seller fraudulently represented as having an engine. Harm will
result to the purchaser, who should not pay the same under the fraudu-
lent misrepresentation as he would pay with full knowledge of the defect.
States should regulate speech not to curb its expression, but to prevent
the harm which may result from its communication. For regulation to
be proper, there should be a finding that its communicative value is im-
paired to the point of permitting regulation. The factors that determine
the point at which regulation will be permitted should indicate whether
the Court should adopt an objective or subjective test of commerciality.
Assume that the Supreme Court is primarily concerned with protecting
commercial speech only when it has informative value and the interest of
the state in economic regulation does not override that value. Unlike
noncommercial speech, commercial speech is unprotected when false,
misleading or unlawful.168 The state's interest in ensuring a clean stream
of commerce apparently dictates this limitation. Thus unprotected com-
mercial speech should be speech which raises the likelihood of one of the
evils that is unprotected. Conversely, commercial speech which does not
present a danger should be fully protected. To distinguish between fully
protected speech and speech subject to regulation or prohibition, the
Court should use a test of commerciality designed to determine whether
167. Bates, 433 U.S. at 383; Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771.
168. Bates, 433 U.S. at 383; Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771.
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the speech may result in a commercial transaction affected by one of the
evils.
An example of false commercial speech that should not be regulated
and an example of false commercial speech that should be regulated
might be useful. Suppose the Druid News Network broadcasts a news
segment criticizing a new vaccine that allegedly cures the flu. As it turns
out, the vaccine is effective. Although the broadcast concerns a commer-
cial product, the speech appears unlikely to result in any of the evils with
which the Court is concerned. This is because no transaction in reliance
on the speech is likely to occur. The speech was calculated to discourage
rather than encourage transactions. Now suppose Silicon Life Incorpo-
rated criticizes the same product as ineffective and suggests consumers
purchase its own remedy that turns out to be wholly ineffective. This
expression raises the possibility of economic harm that the Court wants
to prevent through state regulation.
The Court should focus on the interest of the speaker to bring about a
transaction that may result in harm, which the state would seek to pre-
vent by exercising its traditional police power. A modification of the first
hypothetical can show how this test should be focused on intent and is
therefore subjective. Druid News Service, instead of criticizing the new
vaccine, praises it as a major medical breakthrough. Sales of the vaccine
shoot up dramatically. If the vaccine proves worthless, is the commer-
cial speech subject to regulation? It would appear not. It appears to do
more than propose a commercial transaction. Youngs demonstrated that
speech can be commercial while doing more than proposing a commer-
cial transaction. One must ask why this is not commercial speech . 69
Applying the Youngs factors, it is apparent that the broadcast mentioned
the product name, but it was not a traditional advertisement and there
was no direct economic motive in the report. It could be argued that
ratings, popularity and advertising appeal are dependent on how much
"newsworthiness" a show has and that by falsifying the report, Druid
created a sensational story from which it benefited.
The Court, however, must draw a line with the intent of the speaker
169. See Youngs, 463 U.S. at 66-67. In Youngs, the Court first acknowledged that "most" of the
manufacturer's mailings fell within the "core notion" of commercial speech. The Court, however,
was still faced with categorizing the manufacturer's information pamphlets that the Court conceded
"contain discussion of important public issues such as venereal disease and family planning." Three
additional characteristics of commercial speech were noted and used to determine the pamphlets
were commercial speech: the pamphlets were "advertisements," they referred to a "specific prod-
uct," and there was an "economic motivation" behind the mailings.
[Vol. 63:649
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because in any profit motivated publication, there is a motive to generate
interest and thereby increase profit. Profit motive alone has not been
sufficient for the Court to categorize speech as commercial speech.1 7
0 If
the speaker's interest would be equally served if no transaction is entered
into, then the speech should be termed noncommercial despite the fact
that its subject matter is a product mentioned by name. Any other result
would categorize news reports and product evaluations by consumer ad-
vocates as commercial. If the focus is on the subjective element of intent,
the state would be allowed to attack speech which is promotional and
intended to induce economic behavior that may result in harm. If the
state seeks to regulate economic speech on the basis of its concern for
economic or commercial matters rather than concern for substantive
harms, the Court should analyze the action as impermissible subject mat-
ter regulation.
Although explained in greater detail elsewhere, 17' it is worthwhile to
discuss this possible subjective formulation of the commercial speech
test. To be useful and lasting, the values underlying the commercial
speech doctrine should dictate this test rather than being an ad hoc re-
sponse to precedent.
The test, based on prior Court cases, may be phrased this way: When
the purpose of the speech would not be equally served if the audience
failed to enter into a commercial transaction, then the speech is commer-
cial. In summation, the speech is commercial when made to promote a
170. See New York Times, 376 U.S. at 266. In responding to the argument that there was no first
amendment protection because the allegedly libelous statements were published as part of a paid,
"commercial" advertisement, the Court stated that if this fact alone were determinative, it
would discourage newspapers from carrying 'editorial advertisements' . . . and so might
shut off an important outlet for the promulgation of information and ideas by persons who
do not themselves have access to publishing facilities-who wish to exercise their freedom
of speech. . . . [Otherwise] the effect would be to shackle the First Amendment in its
attempt to secure 'the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antag-
onistic sources.'
Id.
171. See Barnes, Unlawful Commercial Speech, supra note 5, at 480-85. The test was first pro-
posed in my previous article and, together with the objective tests discussed at infra notes 243-56 and
accompanying text, formed the basis for an argument that commercial speech once defined might
more easily fit with the general first amendment doctrine. Unlawful commercial speech can be
viewed as a clear and present danger. See Barnes, Unlawful Commercial Speech, supra note 5, at
498-506. While that analysis prompted the broader thoughts that culminated in this Article, they
were more tentatihe and less than fully developed. Although I hope they are no more deficient than
the present analysis, they are only a sidelight to the central issue of that article. The greater develop-
ment here is in large part an attempt to make the choice of a test easier and more logical, consistent
and sensitive to normative concerns, a problem that was not treated in the earlier article.
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commercial transaction. Applied to the above hypotheticals, Silicon's
statement is commercial because its purpose is to induce sales of its prod-
uct despite the additional informational value of criticizing the competi-
tor's product. Silicon's speech serves this informational value as well as
did the story by Druid News Service which criticized the product. The
purpose of Druid's speech, however, was served without the listeners
turning to a competing product and is, therefore, noncommercial speech.
The result is fully consistent with the test of commerciality in Youngs.
Because the underlying values are better articulated, it provides more
direction and aid to those concerned with the limits of regulation.
This test can be represented by intersecting four categories of purpose
with four categories describing the subject of the message. The following
chart illustrates this purpose and subject intersection to indicate how
messages should be categorized if a subjective test is chosen. To reem-
phasize, this is only one application of the subjective test. Other possible
applications exist and results will vary according to the normative values
brought to the task. Any possible application will necessarily involve the
same dangers of over- or under-inclusiveness that exist whenever the
Court examines subjective intent. This Article will discuss the dangers in
greater detail following the chart.
[Vol. 63:649
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By classifying the message to be tested according to its purpose and the
tactic used, the speech may be categorized as commercial or noncommer-
cial. Thus, all offers, as that term is used in contract terminology, are
commercial. Positive statements about a good are also commercial when
the purpose is served only if the consumer is encouraged to enter a trans-
action to purchase the good, although it is unnecessary that the transac-
tion be for the particular good or involve the marketer mentioned.
Negative statements about a good are also commercial when the purpose
of the statement is served only if the advertisement induces the consumer
to turn to another good in competition with the criticized commodity.
Commercial speech, under this subjective test, would not include criti-
cisms of a product, service or marketer when the purpose is informa-
tional and is not to encourage a transaction for a competing good.
Turning to a competitor, however, may be the natural consequence of the
speech, but so long as the purpose of the speech is equally well served if
no transaction is consumated, then the speech is noncommercial. Simi-
larly, a message that praises a good can be noncommercial even though
the result may be an increase in the number of transactions. This occurs
so long as the purpose of the message would be equally well served if the
audience had chosen not to enter any transactions.
This test is not offered as a schematic definition to answer all questions
of categorization. Each situation requires application of the critical ele-
ment of purpose, or intent, in determining whether the speech is com-
mercial. If the speech's purpose is to encourage a particular transaction
or the creation of a market for future transactions, then the message is
commercial. The test treats purely informational messages as noncom-
mercial. Those messages which have a purpose that is equally well
served when no transaction is entered fail to implicate the second value,
deference to traditional police power control of economic transactions.
This is one of the two apparent normative values underlying the commer-
cial speech doctrine. Examples of purely informational speech of which
the purpose is equally well served if no transaction occurs include news
reports and consumer testing and evaluation services.
Mixed messages, which consist both of commercial and noncommer-
cial parts, should be treated as commercial. An example of a mixed
message is: "Support the fight against whaling. Buy Zenith
Automobiles. For every car bought, we donate $100." These messages
are necessarily treated as commercial to prevent abuse. When a speaker
wishes the full protection of the first amendment, he must now include
[Vol. 63:649
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commercial concerns and confuse the issue. Necessity dictates this por-
tion of the test rather than a normative determination that mixed
messages are no more vaulable than commercial messages. 172 To charac-
terize mixed messages as noncommercial would invite evasion of regula-
tion through the addition of gratuitous noncommercial statements in the
speech.
The subjective test should be useful if the normative value underlying
the commercial speech doctrine is protection of commercial speech for its
informational function with the concommitant circumscription of protec-
tion to allow state regulation in the exercise of police powers. The con-
nection to commerce comes from the promotional aspect of the message.
If the message is intended to prompt a commercial transaction, it is likely
to raise concerns with which the state's police power deals. The evils of
substantive commercial harm are present when there is a direct connec-
tion between the speech and the harm regulated. With this differentia-
tion between promotional and nonpromotional messages, the danger of
overinclusiveness is inextricably linked. Presumably it will be left to
state and local governments and their administrative agencies to distin-
guish "promotion" from "critique." This Article will explore the diffi-
culties in making the distinction and the uneasiness that this delegation
should generate.
A. Dun and Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.
1 73
Greenmoss illustrates the need for better articulation of the commercial
speech doctrine. In Greenmoss the Court did address the issue of
whether a credit report is commercial speech. 174 Rather than determine
172. See Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 538-39 (Brennan, J., concurring) (citing examples where the
speaker might escape application of the commercial speech doctrine); Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S.
at 764-65 (suggesting that a pharmacist could pose as a social commentator); Valentine v. Chresten-
sen, 316 U.S. at 53 (Chrestensen attempted to evade the statute by printing a protest on the back of
the commercial handbill).
173. 105 S. Ct. 2939 (1985).
174. There was a last-minute entry ordering separate briefs and argument on the issue of
whether the nature of speech as economic or commercial should offset the standard of care required
of the speaker. 53 U.S.L.W. 3183 (1984). See also 53 U.S.L.W. 3165 (1984) (hearings). Yet the
Court virtually ignored this issue in favor of a basis of decision that left the Court divided with a
three-judge plurality and four dissenters. See Dun and Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.,
105 S Ct. 2939, 2944-48 (1985). Justice Brennan addressed the question of commerciality and sug-
gested that credit reports are not commercial speech. His test of commerciality, though, is that
described in Youngs as the core notion and there appears to be no indication of whether he would
command a majority of the Court to limit the characterization to advertising of goods and services.
Id at 2962 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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whether economic or commercial speech should be granted protection in
defamation actions when the publication is a false credit report, the
Court decided the case on the applicability of Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc. 175
Dun and Bradstreet prepared a credit report on Greenmoss and dis-
tributed it to subscribers of its services. 176 This report inaccurately
stated that Greenmoss had filed a petition in bankruptcy. t77 Dun and
Bradstreet's "reporter" on Vermont bankruptcies submitted the inaccu-
rate information. This reporter was a high school student paid two hun-
dred dollars per year for his services, who mistakenly read a former
Greenmoss employee's filing as being Greenmoss's filing.'17 The parties
did not address the commercial speech doctrine in the initial briefs and
only did so in supplemental briefs the Court ordered after the first round
of oral arguments. 179 Greenmoss is pertinent because of the Court's call
for arguments on the applicability of the commercial speech doctrine and
its subsequent failure to address the issue. As a first amendment case and
particularly a defamation decision, Greenmoss is a significant opinion be-
cause it established that the Gertz limitations did not apply to speech on
matters of purely private concern.180
The opinion does not affect Gertz's limitations on presumed and puni-
tive damages in actions for speech of public concern, the need to prove
fault, and the requirement of actual malice for recovery in cases brought
by public figures and public officials. 181
While not directly reaching the issue of whether speech of a commer-
cial nature should also be given less protection in defamation actions,
Greenmoss offers an adumbration of the Court's apparent value judgment
that commercial speech which defames deserves less protection. The
Court does little to define private speech. Justice Powell for the plurality
wrote:
In a related context, we have held that '[w]hether... speech addresses a
matter of public concern must be determined by [the expression's] content,
175. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
176. See Greenhouse Builders, Inc, 143 Vt. at 70-71, 461 A.2d at 416, afl'd, 105 S. Ct. 2939
(1985).
177. 143 Vt. at 70-71, 461 A.2d at 416.
178. Id.
179. See Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 53 U.S.L.W. 3183 (1985) (order requesting briefs and
arguments).
180. See Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 105 S. Ct. at 2946.
181. Id. at 2946-47, 2955 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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form, and context ... as revealed by the whole record.' These factors indi-
cate that petitioner's credit report concerns no public issue. It was speech
solely in the individual interest of the speaker and its specific business audi-
ence.... Moreover, since the credit report was made available to only five
subscribers, who, under the terms of the subscription agreement, could not
disseminate it further, it cannot be said that the report involves any 'strong
interest in the free flow of commercial information.
182
The use of the word "business" to "modify" audience appears to be a
salutary narrowing of an otherwise unuseful phrase. The most effective
speech in terms of its results and economic cost will typically be useful
only to the audience. This is true for both ideological and commercial
speech. The Court's use of the word "business" in this context must
inferentially connote a lowered public interest in such matters; the
Court's opinion, however, does not support such a proposition. The lan-
guage thus appears to be another example of an unarticulated bias in
favor of ideological concerns. The Court's underlying bias seems to be
that business concerns are by nature narrower and of less public interest.
The Court discusses the commercial speech doctrine only in the sec-
tion of the opinion in which it determines that the speech is private
speech. Because of this limited increase to the commercial speech doc-
trine, there is limited damage to public debate flowing from the decision
not to apply the Gertz restrictions on defamation actions to private
speech. Justice Powell stated that credit reports, like advertising, are a
hardy form of speech unlikely to be deterred by incidental regulation.
183
More significantly, the Court did not hold credit reports to be commer-
cial speech. 184
Justice Brennan's dissent did not address the issue of whether the com-
mercial nature of the speech should lower the standard of care Gertz re-
quired, but he did attack the conclusion that the economic nature of the
speech narrowed the audience and made it of less public concern. 185 Jus-
tice Brennan and three other Justices appear to believe that the nature of
the speech alone, whether it is economic or commercial, should not dic-
tate the level of protection in defamation actions.186 Beyond this propo-
182. Id. at 2947.
183. See id. Justice Brennan in dissent rejected characterization of credit reports as commercial
speech. Id. at 2962 (Brennan, J., dissenting). He went on to rely on the "core notion" of commer-
cial speech, classic advertising of a good or service, as the hallmark of commerciality. Id.
184. See supra note 174.
185. 105 S. Ct. at 2962 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also supra note 174.
186. See supra note 183.
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sition the Court seems scarcely to have considered the values supporting
the commercial speech doctrine itself. Lingering signs of the unarticu-
lated prejudice against commercial speech are even present in the
dissent.18 7
The absence of a complete enunciation of the normative basis for the
commercial speech doctrine justified the Court's request for reargument
on whether the doctrine should be applicable to credit reports. Because
the Court ultimately did not address the issue, Greenmoss's significance
to this Article lies in why the issue was raised and how the litigants
treated it. The litigants' responses were varied and generally lacked nor-
mative development. The "tests" the litigants developed to explain why
credit reports are or are not commercial speech lacked sensitivity to this
issue of normative values. 188
Dun and Bradstreet took the position that its credit reports did not fall
within the Supreme Court's definition of commercial speech. 8 9 Dun and
Bradstreet observed that with the possible exception of Metromedia Inc.
v. San Diego, the Supreme Court cases involved actual instances of com-
mercial advertisement or solicitation for goods or services.190 Dun and
Bradstreet then pointed to the expressed value of permitting state regula-
tion of conduct in commercial transactions and suggested that regulation
of credit report statements concerning parties other than the seller of the
good or service should be noncommercial. Because such statements are
not promotional, they do not raise the predicate of deference to state
regulation of commercial transaction.
Dun and Bradstreet also argued that even if the speech involved in
credit reports were commercial speech, regulation through defamation
liability would not comport with the Central Hudson demand for a sub-
stantial interest. 1 ' In Gertz the Supreme Court stated that there is no
187. Justice Brennan wrote: "As Thornhill suggests, the choices we make when we step into the
voting booth may well be the products of what we have learned from the myriad of daily economic
and social phenomemon that surround us." 105 S. Ct. at 2961.
188. This is not a criticism of counsel, some of whom did an admirable job of setting up the
possible normative basis for the Court's ruling. It is not even a criticism of the Court. It is too easy
in the relative leisure of academic life with months or even years to devote to consideration of a
problem to find fault in decisions that should be timely resolutions of the disputes between litigants
as well as thoughtful interpretation of the Constitution. It is offered as a constructive suggestion.
189. Petitioner's Supplemental Brief on Reargument at 40-44, Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Green.
moss Builders, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2939 (1985).
190. Petitioner's Supplemental Brief at 40-41.
191. 447 U.S. at 564.
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substantial state interest in compensating for other than actual injury. 19 2
The decision, however, left open the questions of why commercial speech
is less protected than other types of speech, and whether less protection is
based on more than a desire to continue state economic regulation of
commercial transactions. The Court fails to answer why the test is not a
compelling state interest test as in the direct regulation of noncommercial
speech. 193
Finally, Dun and Bradstreet argued that it is difficult to distinguish
between commercial speech and noncommercial speech which is of a
commercial or economic nature.' 94 Implicit in this argument is a will-
ingness to accept a dividing line between proposals for commercial trans-
actions in the form of advertising and solicitations which would be
commercial speech under prior cases. 195
Dun and Bradstreet emphasized the importance of commerce and eco-
nomic concerns and the Court's dicta about the need to receive informa-
tion to make informed economic choices. 196 They also stated that speech
of an economic or commercial nature has been fully protected when it
was not promotional or advertising in nature.1 97 Other than with promo-
tional or advertising speech, the informational value is not diminished by
deference to state regulation of economic transactions. In summary,
Dun and Bradstreet did an admirable job of tying its arguments into the
two competing values deducible from prior Court opinions. The argu-
ments lacked cohesion based on the normative concerns; that weakness,
however, is probably attributable to insufficient emphasis on normative
concerns in prior Court opinions.
Respondent Greenmoss's argument illustrates with even greater clarity
the result of the Court's inattention to normative values. Its argument
proceeded from the premise that it would win by convincing the Court
that past opinions had not foreclosed application of the commercial
speech doctrine to credit reports. This would be sufficient to explain why
credit reports should be included within the category of commercial
speech if, in addition, any "harm" would result from lack of regula-
192. 418 U.S. at 349 (1974).
193. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
194. Petitioner's Supplemental Brief on Rearguments at 44-45, Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Green-
moss Builders, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2939 (1985).
195. Id. at 40-41.
196. Id. at 35-38.
197. Id. at 39.
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tion.' 98 Not surprisingly Greenmoss emphasized the need for the states
to regulate this kind of speech. 19 9
To support its conclusion, Greenmoss offered a definition of commer-
cial speech which included credit reports: "combination of a particular
profit motive and of content and subject matter triggers the categoriza-
tion of commercial speech." 2" Dun and Bradstreet had argued that
speech about someone else's product should not be classified as commer-
cial speech because the state's interest in regulating the speech disap-
peared when the transaction involved other parties. Greenmoss
countered this and advanced Pittsburgh Press20 as an example of speech
held to be commercial despite the lack of direct link between the sex
differentiated categories in the employment contracts.20 2
This argument, however, fails for two reasons. The Court decided
Pittsburgh Press prior to the commercial speech cases and did not address
the relevant issues. More importantly the regulation is best viewed as a
regulation of the contract to place advertisements in sex differentiated
columns.2 °3 It is this contract that constitutes a commercial transaction
subject to regulation. The promotion or offer of unlawful services raised
the need for regulation.
Greenmoss devoted a substantial portion of its argument to justifying
the inclusion of credit reports in the category of commercial speech as
the Court had defined it.2° The Court had incorporated two factors into
the definition: hardiness and verifiability. Without normative values, the
tests of hardiness and verifiability are reduced to vague and unprincipled
indicia of whatever the person advancing them chooses to establish.
Here Greenmoss and the amicus curiae for Greenmoss argued that infor-
mation in credit reports is primarily factual, available from public
sources and not subject to hasty evaluation to meet "deadlines."205 Ver-
198. See Supplemental Brief of Respondent on Reargument at 36-39, Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v.
Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2939 (1985).
199. Id. at 39.
200. Id. at 42.
201. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, rei'd de-
nied, 414 U.S. 881 (1973).
202. See Supplemental Brief of Respondent on Reargument at 43, Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v.
Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2939 (1985).
203. See supra note 201 and accompanying text.
204. See Supplemental Brief of Respondent on Reargument at 44-47, Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v.
Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2939 (1985).
205. Id.; Brief Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent Greenmoss Builders, Inc., at 12-15, 19-
20, Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2939 (1985).
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ifiability as it had previously been used by the Court referred to the ad-
vertiser's knowledge of the product or service, which allowed careful
scrutiny of the advertisement. It was then a product of the inherent
nature of the knowledge that would allow the advertiser to choose be-
tween nonmisleading and truthful statements to advertise the product.20 6
With reference to the hardiness factor, Greenmoss argued that the de-
cision to print the information is a business decision in which risk is
weighed against profit. With credit reports, profit outweighs risk if the
service is properly performed which results in hardy speech.2 °7 The obvi-
ous response is that a similar analysis can be applied to most newspapers
and electronic media networks. They are engaged in profit-making activ-
ities and can weigh the risks. If the risk is worth taking, they should be
subject to the same liability and regulation.
Without deciding that the credit report was commercial speech, the
Court relied on the concepts of hardiness and verifiability to conclude
that the protection of Gertz did not apply.2" 8 The role of these factors in
establishing the parameters of private speech is unclear. The Court
seems to have resorted to them simply to mollify those who might argue
that deterence of private speech could damage first amendment interests.
The Court's classification of this speech as private, however, would not
damage first amendment interests because only false speech is subject to
defamation actions. Commercial speech is valuable only when it is true.
It is profitable speech at least "arguably"2 9 more objectively verifiable
and thus unlikely to be deterred by the absence of the Gertz's protections.
Reliance on these factors seems misplaced because of their applicabil-
ity to other traditionally favored speech. As the dissenting justices ar-
gued, profit motive has never served as a basis for establishing the level of
protection accorded expression.2 0 The following example illustrates this
line of reasoning: a public interest group places advertisements in vari-
ous newspapers attacking both a proposed utility increase and the public
utilities commission which favors the increase. The advertisement also
206. See supra note 135. See also Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564 n.6.
207. Supplemental Brief of Respondent on Reargument at 45, Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Green-
moss Builders, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2939 (1985).
208. See Greenmoss, 105 S. Ct. at 2947.
209. It is curious that the plurality chose to add this modifier. If it is merely arguable rather
than obvious or intuitive to most readers, is it a legitimate basis for the Justices' conclusion? I do not
believe so. As previously discussed, the lack of greater objectivity in economic speech can be demon-
strated by comparing examples of economic and ideological speech.
210. See Greenmoss, 105 S. Ct. at 2960 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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criticizes the commission's record of generally supporting such increases
during a period of decreasing energy costs. This speech is clearly
"hardy;" the consumers want to save money and have demonstrated a
high level of motivation and commitment to their cause. It is preposter-
ous to suggest that the Constitution provides any less protection for any
false statements the consumer group may make. Yet because the Court
fails to delineate the normative basis for the categories of commercial and
private speech, there can be no legal distinction. To this point there has
been no articulation of this type of distinction.
The Greenmoss case foreshadows the value which compels categoriza-
tion. Some speech is less valuable because it does not command public
attention.21' The state's interest in preventing defamatory speech offsets
the interest in nonpublic speech. The Court has yet to announce the link
in the commercial speech category between the lower interest and state
power to regulate commerce. The Greenmoss decision offered the Court
the opportunity to synthesize the newly created private speech category
with the commercial speech doctrine by focusing on the elements of lim-
ited interest and the desirability of state regulation of harmful speech.
An effective synthesis must narrow the commercial speech doctrine and
articulate why some commercial speech is of limited value. If the Court's
objective is to prevent economic harm flowing from untruthful commer-
cial speech, it should limit the category to the kind of speech likely to
produce this harm. The parameters of the doctrine should not be based
merely on the sotto voce elitism apparent in the Court ascribing values to
all members of society. The Court should be sensitive to the diversity of
interests as well as to the diversity of opinion on "public" issues.
B. Securities Exchange Commission v. Lowe
In a brief amicus curiae for Greenmoss, Sunward Corporation argued
that limitation of the commercial speech category would damage the
state's ability to regulate certain commercial activity. Citing Securities
Exchange Commission v. Lowe,21 2 Sunward suggested that such a limita-
tion would hamper the state's interest in regulating commercial activity
such as investment advising.2"3 In Lowe a divided Second Circuit panel
reversed the district court's denial of an S.E.C. request to enjoin publica-
211. Id. at 2946.
212. 725 F.2d 892 (2d Cir.), rev'd, 105 S. Ct. 2557 (1985).
213. Brief of Amicus Curiae in Support of Greenmoss Builders, Inc., at 20, Dun & Bradstreet,
Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2939 (1985).
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tion of investment newsletters and revoke Lowe's investment advisor's
registration.214 The S.E.C. had revoked Lowe's registration because of
his prior criminal convictions.2 15 The Investment Advisers Act (the
-Act") requires individuals to register prior to using the mails or any
means of interstate commerce in connection with the business of invest-
ment advisement.216  The Act broadly defines "investment adviser" to
include any person who for compensation advises others, either directly
or through publication, as to the value of securities or the advisability of
investing in or selling securities, or who for compensation publicizes se-
curities reports.2 17  Lowe's publication of two subscription investment
newsletters brought him within the scope of the Act.2 18
The Second Circuit held that the S.E.C. could properly revoke his re-
gistration. In dissent, Judge Brieant argued that the majority failed to
give due deference to first amendment protection.219 The majority held
that the publication of the newsletters was commercial speech and that
the state's regulatory function dominated any speech interest in this
214. See Securities Exchange Commission v. Lowe, 725 F.2d 892, 895-96, 901-02 (2d Cir. 1984),
rev'd, 105 S. Ct. 2557 (1985).
215. 725 F.2d at 895.
216. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(a). "Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, it shall be un-
lawful for any investment adviser, unless registered under this section, to make use of the mails or
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce in connection with his or its business as an
investment adviser."
217. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(ll):
'Investment adviser' means any person who, for compensation, engages in the business of
advising others, either directly or through publications or writings, as to the value of secur-
ities or as to the advisability of investing in, purchasing, or selling securities, or who, for
compensation and as part of a regular business, issues or promulgates analyses or reports
concerning securities; but does not include (A) a bank, or any bank holding company as
defined in the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 [12 U.S.C. 1841 etseq.] which is not an
investment company; (B) any lawyer, accountant, engineer, or teacher whose performance
of such services is solely incidental to the practice of his profession; (C) any broker or
dealer whose performance of such services is solely incidental to the conduct of his business
as a broker or dealer and who receives no special compensation therefore; (D) the publisher
of any bona fide newspaper, news magazine or business or financial publication of general
and regular circulation; (E) any person whose advice, analysis or reports relate to no secur-
ities other than securities which are direct obligations of or obligations guaranteed as to
principal or interest by the United States, or securities issued or guaranteed by corpora-
tions in which the United States has a direct or indirect interest which shall have been
designated by the Secretary of the Treasury, pursuant to section 3(a)(12) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 [15 U.S.C. 78c(a)(12)], as exempted securities for the purposes of
that Act [15 U.S. C. 78a et seq.]; or (F) such other persons not within the intent of this
paragraph, as the Commission may designate by rules and regulations or order.
218 Lowe, 725 F.2d at 898.
219 Id. at 903-10 (Brieant, J., dissenting).
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situation.22 °
The Supreme Court decided Lowe 22' before GreenmosS. 222 The Court
avoided the constitutional issue and instead focused on the statute's con-
struction.223 The Court determined that Congress intended the statute to
exclude nonpersonalized investment publications.224 The concurring
Justices, who would have decided the case on the constitutional issue, did
not address the question of the commercial nature of the speech. Justice
White's concurrence was written in the alternative, assuming that Lowe's
publications were first commercial and then noncommercial. In either
case the injunction against publication was said to be an invalid restric-
tion not narrowly drawn. Justice White concluded that regardless of
which assumption was valid, the statute was too broadly drawn to satisfy
the state interest without unduly interfering with expression, and thus,
the injunction was an invalid restriction.225
The significance of Lowe is in the Second Circuit's treatment of the
speech as commercial speech. The Second Circuit could point to at least
two arguments in favor of applying the commercial speech doctrine to
the facts of Lowe. First, the Supreme Court had not previously limited
the doctrine to advertising.226 The fact that the Court did not define the
limits of the doctrine's applicability, however, is insufficient to serve as a
220. Id. at 898-901. In reaching this conclusion the Second Circuit looked to Chralik for au-
thority. Citing Ohralik for the broad proposition that government "does not lose its power to regu-
late commercial activity deemed harmful to the public whenever speech is a component of that
activity," they further listed specific examples of communications that are presently regulated and do
not offend the First Amendment. Id. at 899. The examples provided were exchange of information
about securities, corporate proxy statements, exchange of price and product information among
competitors and employers' threats of retaliation for the labor activities of employees. Id.
221. Lowe v. Securities Exchange Commission, 105 S. Ct. 2557 (1985).
222. The Court decided Lowe on June 10, 1985. Greenmoss was decided June 26, 1985,
223. The majority frustrated three justices as well, who concurred on the basis that the action to
enjoin publication was unconstitutional. These justices felt that the statutory construction was in-
correct because it might well go further toward frustrating congressional goals than declaring the
specific provision in the statute for injunctions to be unconstitutional. See Lowe, 105 S. Ct. at 2578-
82 (White, J., concurring).
224. Id. at 2570.
225. Id. at 2585-86 (White, J., concurring).
226. 725 F.2d at 900. The Second Circuit, while first acknowledging that the Third Circuit in
Ad World, Inc. v. Township of Doylestown, 672 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 975
(1982), held that commercial speech is limited solely to product of service advertising, looked to
Bates as standing for the proposition that the Supreme Court had not limited commercial speech to
advertising. Id. The specific language in Bates on which the Court relied was "[if] commercial
speech is to be distinguished, it must be distinguished by its content not its form." Id. (citation
omitted). The Second Circuit then distinguished Central Hudson, which stated: "[t]he First
Amendment's concern for commercial speech is bed on the information function of advertising," on
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means of extending these limits to advertisements. Second, the need for
regulation to protect investors also favored the application of the doc-
trine.227 The Court, however, failed to distinguish Lowe's newsletters
from the Wall Street Journal, Barron's, Forbes, or a host of other invest-
ment advice publications. The Court relied on the statutory definition
which excluded "publishers of any bona fide newspaper, newsmagazine
or business or financial publications of general or regular circulation"
from the registration requirements. 228 The opinion thus leaves unan-
swered the question whether Congress could properly address the prob-
lem by making that distinction. According to the Second Circuit, when
the S.E.C. sought passage of the Act, it "emphasized the potential for
abuse if persons in the business of publishing investment advice were
willing to 'lend themselves to the use of stock market promoters and ma-
nipulators.' ,229 The S.E.C. was also concerned with the failure to dis-
close that the publication, or a third party, had compensated the adviser
for his advice or that the adviser had an interest in the promoted
security.23°
With these concerns in mind, it is easy to see why Congress wanted
registered advisers. The statute, however, was passed in 1940, before
heightened sensitivity to the value of speech about economic concerns,
and the statute in effect permitted a prior restraint on the basis of a per-
ceived predilection to dishonesty demonstrated by prior convictions.
This predilection was not perceived to exist if the speaker published or
wrote for a "bona fide" newspaper. Congress, or the S.E.C. using the
power granted it by Congress, could punish or regulate publication of
false or misleading information which does not disclose the financial ad-
viser's interest. The state thus seems to have a compelling interest for
regulation, which would be carried out in the least restrictive manner if
the sanctions were based on the misleading publication.23' What stands
out as unsupportable is the judgment of Congress and the S.E.C. that
certain types of publications are subject to a greater potential for abuse
than the same type of material published by a "bona fide" newspaper.2 32
the ground that the Court actually defined commercial speech as "expression related solely to the
economic interest of the speaker and its audience." Id. (citations omitted).
227. 725 F.2d at 901-02.
228. Id. at 897. See also supra note 216 and accompanying text.
229. 725 F.2d at 897.
230, Id.
231. See supra note 193.
232. See Lowe, 725 F.2d at 900.
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The recent scandal involving the Wall Street Journal's "Heard on the
Street" column illustrates that even "bona fide" publications are not im-
mune from the abuse with which Congress was concerned. More impor-
tantly, it is possible to distinguish Lowe-type advisers as publishing
commercial speech, while excluding "bona fide" type adviser's columns
from that category. Yet had the Court permitted regulation of this type
of speech as necessary to prevent the potential for abuse, it could also
permit the licensing and regulation of "bona fide" newspapers.233 This,
seems patently unacceptable.
As the concurring Justices suggested, there appears to be an implicit
judgment that the regulation was invalid as applied and that the majority
construed the exception to cover nontraditional journals and newsletters
to avoid invalidation of the regulatory scheme.2 34 Assuming this infer-
ence is correct, then all nine Justices believed that it would be unconstitu-
tional for the S.E.C. to enjoin publications by persons it had decided
were untrustworthy. To allow the S.E.C. to enjoin publications when
harm to investors had not been shown would prevent the publication of
honest and nonfraudulent information.2 35 Even under the lower level of
scrutiny applied to commercial speech, this regulatory scheme is broader
than necessary to achieve the state's goal of preventing self-dealing and
dishonesty on the part of investment advisers.236 It swept too broadly by
permitting injunctions.
The Court thus adds very little to the normative development of the
commercial speech doctrine. By failing to distinguish between commer-
cial and noncommercial speech both in Lowe and Greenmoss, the Court
has left the determination of commerciality to lower courts, which may
be tempted to accentuate the underlying and unarticulated prejudice
against commercial matters by subordinating the issue to the state's in-
terest in regulating these publications. The Second Circuit opinion leaves
one with the impression that the finding of a legitimate purpose was suffi-
cient to regulate the commercial speech. The court did not test the scope
of the regulation because commercial speech was involved and not likely
to be deterred.237 One should ask whether the lack of guidance from the
233. Id. at 907-08 (Brieant, J., dissenting).
234. See Lowe, 105 S. Ct. at 2581-82 (White, J., concurring).
235. IdL
236. See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566. See also Lowe, 105 S. Ct. at 2586 (White, J.,
concurring).
237. See Lowe, 725 F.2d at 901.
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Supreme Court contributed to the Second Circuit's rather ambivalent at-
titude toward the value of commercial and economic speech.
C. Return to Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss
Lowe v. S.E.C. and the arguments of Greenmoss should have held great
significance for the Court. The conclusion that commercial speech can
be expanded to include credit reports and investment advice illustrates a
lack of recognition of the Court's apparent values. Greenmoss's test fo-
cusing on speech having value only in providing information is simply
too vague as an enunciation of normative values. When combined with
the value of deference to state regulation, it is more useful in establishing
the balance of concerns by focusing on the predicate of the regulation.2"8
If these two values were enunciated as a normative basis for the limited
protection of commercial speech, the test of commerciality should focus
on the promotional aspect.
A subjective test from the pattern proposed in this Article should be
selected to provide this focus. This promotion test would give the result
Congress and the S.E.C. sought without the need to distinguish among
"bona fide" newspapers and other investment advisers. Had the advice
been offered to induce a commercial transaction, it should be classified as
commercial no matter who was the speaker. Thus advice offered with an
underlying profit motive or undisclosed interest in the security would be
commercial and regulable whether it appeared in the Wall Street Journal
or in one of Lowe's publications. Greenmoss's argument that an adver-
tising or promotional link would eliminate speech about a transaction by
third parties from regulation is incorrect.239 So long as the third party
speaker's interest is equally served if no transaction is entered into,
speech is commercial and regulable.
Only the dissent considered the arguments on this issue. The four
dissenting Justices concluded that credit reports are not commercial
speech. While prior cases did not make the category of commercial
speech coextensive with advertising, the distinguishing factor seemed to
be the lack of informational value.2" This alone would be enough to
238. Farber, supra note 118, at 386-93; Youngs, 463 U.S. at 80 (Stevens, J., concurring).
239. See Supplemental Brief of Respondent on Reargument at 41-42, Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v.
Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2939 (1985); Brief Amicus Curiae in support of Respondent
Greenmoss Builders, Inc. at 17-19, Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 105 S. Ct.
2939 (1985).
240. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 765. The Court first assumes two premises regarding "ad-
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encompass credit reports and investment newsletters because there is no
advertising of the speaker, service or product. The purpose is to provide
information about the contemplated transactions, whether an extension
of credit by, or the purchase of securities from, a third party. This takes
into account, however, only one part of the dichotomized values which
appear to be the basis of the commercial speech doctrine. Of equal con-
cern is the need to ensure continued state regulation of commerce.241
This regulation serves a second function of distinguishing commercial
speech by its hardiness and verifiability, and reduces the risk of a chilling
effect, even for speech that is only valuable for the information it
conveys. 242
Without a link to promotional purpose whether it is called advertising
or merely intent to promote a commercial transaction, dilution of protec-
tion for noncommercial speech, the fear of which has prevented equal
treatment for the categories, is invited. Because of the asserted need to
police commerce, the Court would tolerate state interference as to non-
commercial and commercial speech. The level of equality would be
sought on a lower plane than what is acceptable.2 43 The concern again
should be to focus on the need to regulate commercial transactions, and
not to regulate communications that simply concern economic or com-
mercial matters.
When courts do not inquire into the speaker's subjective purpose, they
vertisements" role in our free enterprise system. The first premise is that "[a]ny advertising, how-
ever, tasteless and excessive," assists the private purchaser in making an informed and intelligent
economic decision because the purchaser is informed as to whom is producing and selling what
product, for what reason, and at what price. The second premise is that private economic decisions
are in the public interest. From this the Court concludes that the "free flow" of commercial infor-
mation is "indispensable" to the free enterprise system. The Court further concludes that this infor-
mation "is also indispensable to the formation of intelligent opinions as to how that system ought to
be regulated or altered" and therefore serves the goal of "public decision making in a democracy."
See also Bates, 433 U.S. at 364.
241. See Youngs, 463 U.S. at 68-69; Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 506; Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at
562-65; Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 455-56; Bates, 433 U.S. at 381; Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771 n.24,
772-73.
242. See Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771 n.24. The Court, reflecting on the common differ-
ences between commercial speech and other varieties, stated that
[t]he truth of commercial speech, for example, may be more easily verifiable by its dissemi-
nator than, let us say, news reporting or political commentary, in that ordinarily the adver-
tiser seeks to disseminate information about a specific product or service that he himself
provides and presumably knows more than anyone else. Also, commercial speech may be
more durable than other kinds.
243. See Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 506; Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563 n.5; Chralik, 436 U.S. at
456.
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must impose an objective test which assigns commercial speech to a
lower position because of its subject matter. An objective test of com-
merciality is necessarily more restrictive because it lacks the normative
values assigned to the state's regulation of commercial transactions.
Greenmoss's supplemental brief seems to suggest an objective test by de-
fining commercial speech to include everything that assists the audience
to form "commitments which are partially part of a contract of sale or
service. '"2" What Greenmoss did not consider and the Court did not
address is how a limited examination of the intent behind the motive
would aid the Court in distinguishing between Dun and Bradstreet credit
reports and New York Times editorials on the inaccuracy of credit re-
ports.245 Both publications are in business to make a profit and the
speech is intended to make their own product more attractive. The only
speech about economic or commercial matters meriting protection under
Greenmoss's test would be that made by an individual who speaks with-
out payment or by a nonprofit organization that does not even earn oper-
ating expenses from the speech.246
Greenmoss's proposed test focusing on economic motive and subject
matter would promote a purely objective test of commerciality. Green-
moss would distinguish credit reports (commercial speech) from newsre-
ports about economic matters (noncommercial speech) on the basis of
motive. Both reports concern commercial matters so the first portion of
the test is not in controversy. Perhaps a traditional newsreport is as a
matter of "commonsense" different, but the Greenmoss test does not re-
quire the differentiation at any particular point. Since both reports deal
with commercial matters, the test is essentially one of motive; it is diffi-
cult, however, to distinguish the economic motive of Dun and Bradstreet
in publicizing credit reports from the economic motive of the Tucson
Guardian in publishing a business page about stock prices. Lenders can
use Dun and Bradstreet's report to decide whether a loan should be
made. Investors can use the Guardian's report to decide whether to
244. Supplemental Brief of Respondent on Reargument at 41, Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Green-
moss Builders, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2939 (1985).
245. Id. at 42-43.
246. Even Consumer Reports could be said to have a "profit motive" in the sense that its evalua-
tions of products are intended to affect consumer choices. Without the evaluations, no one would
likely subscribe and provide the funds needed to operate the magazine. There is a tremendous eco-
nomic stake in the speech even without a "profit motive." The taxpayer has a similar economic
interest in attacking import quotas if she wishes to buy an imported car. The difficulty would be in
separating economic motives from more particularized profit motives.
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purchase securities. Both papers are published with the expectation that
the service will be of sufficient value that customers will purchase the
paper.
A distinction based on the inclusion or exclusion of nonbusiness arti-
cles is equally difficult to justify. The Wall Street Journal, Barron's, and
Forbes all exhibit a strong profit motive in focusing their publications on
economic matters. To escape classification as commercial speech, Dun
and Bradstreet would need only to include Mike Royko and Ellen Good-
man columns or UPI copy.247 At some point the publication becomes
sufficiently general in interest to dissipate the profit motive stigma. The
weakness of Greenmoss's position stems from the fact that most attempts
to make the distinction are subject to this criticism, a fact the Court has
already acknowledged.248 Without clarification of the relevant underly-
ing principles or its normative value, an objective test of commerciality
will never escape this criticism.
Even when combined with the factor of economic or commercial sub-
ject matter, the motivation of profit does not indicate why commercial
speech should be less protected. As previously noted, profit motive is
easily manipulable and is not linked to a value that can be enunciated to
protect traditional economic or commercial commentators and differenti-
ate them from limited interest commentators. Commercial or economic
subject matter was the phrase the Court used in its order requesting sup-
plemental briefs on reargument.249 The Court's implicit judgment is that
speech about commercial or economic matters is more mundane and of
lesser constitutional dignity. 5 0 Unlike the position Professors Bork,
Jackson and Jeffries take, the Court seems to accept that this speech de-
serves some, albeit less, protection than noncommercial or ideological
251expression.
To establish a normative position that commercial speech lacks value,
the test of commerciality must be objective. If speech concerning eco-
nomic or commercial matters is less valuable, then there should be a test
to determine the worth of its content. If the content of the speech pro-
motes goods or services or is simply concerned with economic or com-
247. See Lowe, 725 F.2d at 908 (Brieant, J., dissenting).
248. See Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 521 (Brennan, J., concurring).
249. See supra notes 173-74 and accompanying text.
250. See Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 506-07; Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 557; Ohralik, 436 U.S. at
456.
251. See Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 506-07; Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 557; Chralik, 436 U.S. at
456.
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mercial matters, then it is commercial and less valuable. This test,
however, is too simplistic; it would include Dow Jones quotations, prime
and federal reserve board discount interest rates, announcements of im-
port quotas and numerous other governmental indicators. This test fails
to indicate where mundane commercial advertisement ends and valuable
economic data begins.
Dun and Bradstreet v. Greenmoss presented the Court with an oppor-
tunity to consider a normative basis for commercial speech. The Court's
failure to use this opportunity may indicate a disagreement more funda-
mental than the one which divided the Court in the application of Gertz
to private profit-motivated speech.2 52 In earlier opinions factors were
present that would have been helpful in the search for values. The
Court's use of the hardiness and verifiability factor253 inadequately dis-
tinguished promotional from general economic and commercial matters,
yet carries an interesting implication. In addition, Youngs recognition
that advertising is the "core notion" of commercial speech is a further
indication of the primary factor in circumscribing protection.25 4 This
primary factor is the desire to permit state regulation of commerce as
embodied in promotional, economic and commercial speech.
This Article rejects the premise that commercial speech is less valuable
than noncommercial speech and suggests that if the goal is to permit
states to regulate commerce through the regulation of promotional and
commercial speech, an objective test of commerciality is indispensable.
An objective test, however, cannot coexist with the "of or concerning
commercial or economic matters" language. This test focuses instead on
the limiting principle of the state's regulation of commerce to make the
value acceptable. When the speech's content promotes a good or service,
the speech is commercial even if the speaker's purpose is altruistic. Thus
whether a consumer service gives a product a high rating, or whether
Silicon Life praises its own product in an advertisement, both constitute
commercial speech. The following chart illustrates one formulation of an
objective test.
252. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2939, 2947 (1985). The
balancing of the state interest in protection of individual reputations and the constitutional protec-
tion of expression is better developed because the values on both sides are readily apparent.
253. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 772 n.24. See also supra note 242 and accompanying text.
254. 463 U.S. at 66.
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COMMERCIAL SPEECH
Because the key factor of commercial regulation is promotion, this ob-
jective test would treat negative statements about a product or competi-
tor as noncommercial. The chart provides distinct categories for
criticism and praise directed at the good, service or marketer and also for
criticism and praise with reference to characteristics apart from the good,
service or marketer. This differentiation between speech that does no
more than propose a commercial transaction and speech with broader
implications is critical to any objective test of commercial speech. To
categorize as noncommercial speech which goes beyond mere reference
to the suitability or desirability of a good or service would permit skillful
advertisers to disguise commercial speech by insertions of positive state-
ments. The following example illustrates this point: "Silicon Life Inc. is
cleaning up Silicon Valley. Our new air scrubber has made life better for
everyone living in the South Bay Basin. Buy Silicon products." Silicon's
speech may have a salutary effect of encouraging debate on issues beyond
the usual promotional factors of quality and price. Treatment of this
type of statement as noncommercial, however, would allow marketers to
escape regulation. An imaginative advertising department will easily find
ways to promote its product while avoiding regulation. The proposed
test attempts to avoid evasion of the regulation by treating any positive
statement about a product, service or marketer 255 as commercial speech,
whether it concerns characteristics 256 of the good or service or it is
255. Marketer here is used as a shorthand description of producer, manufacturer, wholesaler,
retailer or anyone else in the distributional chain with an interest in the sale of the good or service.
256. Characteristics here is used as a shorthand description of all matters that would be relevant
to a buyer who is concerned only with how the good will satisfy its intended purpose and includes
such matters as quality, safety, efficiency, and cost. This is a very artificial distinction and points out
one of several weaknesses in this type of objective test. Why wouldn't statements about something
other than characteristics of the good be treated as commercial? Under this formulation they are
treated as commercial, but would one distinguish between these two types if one is uncomfortable
with the result? After all, the announced values of the court have included protection for speech that
does no more than propose the mundane commercial transaction. Here, this speech clearly does
more. The evasion problem should be considered dispositive of any attempt to declare positive state-
ments about issues wider than commercial suitability as anything other than commercial speech.
There remains, however, the possibility of negative statements about goods or services on the basis of
wider issues other than commercial suitability of the product or service as being considered noncom-
mercial speech. Positive statements concern wider matters, yet are treated as mundane commercial
speech and lacking in full constitutional importance. Negative statements on wider issues do not
involve the risk of erosion because they would not be used as a promotional tool. Any link to
positive statements, even the mention of a competitor's product, should result in their treatment as
commercial speech. They would therefore not promote, and lesser regulation would encourage, a
broadening of the issues discussed. Now one must distinguish between "commercial suitability"
characteristics and other wider issues. In actual life, the country of origin of a car may be a very real
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wholly unrelated to the suitability of the good or service.
Unlike the subjective test, the objective test does not require an inquiry
into the speaker's intent. An intent inquiry introduces an unnecessary
element of uncertainty into a determination of commerciality. It also
creates the possibility that the agency making the determination will
have a chilling effect on noncommercial speech. The agency would nec-
essarily have to distinguish between "promotional" speech and "critical"
speech. A speaker wanting to comment on economic issues going be-
yond mere commentary on particular goods or services would have to
contend with the possibility that the agency might discern a promotional
intent when the good or service is mentioned. Any portion of the speech
which might be misleading could subject the speaker to sanctions. This
would discourage speech about topics of greater scope which include eco-
selling point because some may view certain countries of origin more favorably. It is a matter of
taste and does not affect the suitability of the product for its intended purpose. Only such factors as
are objectively determinative of suitability should be considered to be within this group of suitability
characteristics. When the use of the good or service is a function of the personal taste of the con-
sumer, the subject of values should be included within the suitability characteristic category.
Examples are hair styling or a work of art. The value of these services or goods is dependent on
the personal taste of the consumer or whim. How would one then classify the importance of a
manufacturer's pollution record or civil rights record? Presumably not being directly related to
suitability and not being the primary criterion in selection as with the whim involved in hair styling
or art works, the matter is of wider importance and speech concerning it should be treated as non-
commercial. Thus the following alternative chart remains objective yet permits the categorization of
some negative statements that focus on wider issues as noncommercial while capturing as commer-
cial statements which are negative but do no more than attack commercial suitability.
2. 3. 4.
Good or Service Marketer for Marketer for
Good or Service for Other Than Characteristic of Other ThanCharacteristic of Good or Service Characteristic of
Good or Service Good or Service
X. Positive
Statement
Y. Negative
Statement
Modified Objective Test
The test may better address the underlying value by requiring a closer relationship between so-called
mundane subject matter and the categorization of the speech as commercial. It seems, however, to
introduce an anomaly by classifying negative statements about wider issues as noncommercial while
classifying positive statements about the same wider issues as commercial. The sole justification for
this is the need to prevent evasion, a danger raised by the classification of positive statements about
wider issues as noncommercial.
IX 2X 3X 4X
Commercial Commercial Commercial Commercial
IY 2Y 3Y 4Y
Commercial Noncommercial Commercial Noncommercial
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nomic or commercial ideas. The subjective approach thus seems to
threaten first amendment values.257 An objective test would avoid this
necessarily ad hoc determination by treating news reports, consumer rat-
ings, and other nonpromotional information as commercial. The objec-
tive test thus recognizes the inherent weakness of an inquiry into the
speaker's intent and focuses solely on subject matter. Promotional moti-
vation is irrelevant. Moreover, the test eliminates the Court's need to
inquire into the state's regulatory interest.258 What emerges is the disqui-
eting conclusion that commercial speech is less valuable because it con-
cerns something less important to those who decide what is important.
While such a value system is suspect as a normative basis for the com-
mercial speech doctrine, if accepted it would militate in favor of an objec-
tive test. Because of the inability to differentiate meaningfully Dun and
Bradstreet credit reports from The Wall Street Journal articles, an objec-
tive test would classify nonpromotional speech about economic matters
as commercial speech. The logic or philosophy behind the limited value
approach to commercial speech does not dictate this result. Rather it
would be the unfortunate consequence of the Court's acceptance of com-
mercial speech as being of lesser importance and dignity. As a result, it
would classify most articles in the business sections of newspapers and
similar publications as commercial speech.259 Unless the Supreme Court
articulates a different normative basis for the commercial speech doc-
trine, this result is the only one capable of producing consistent results.
For example, the Greenmoss test would use the elements of economic or
commercial subject matter combined with the profit motive to determine
the commerciality of the speech. It appears impossible to chart this test,
as was done with the proposed tests, to remain consistent with the ex-
pressed values and to differentiate between credit reports and the busi-
ness sections of newspapers. Greenmoss's proposed test, therefore, fails
because it does not correctly identify those factors which should be tested
by objective means and those factors which should be tested by subjective
257. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). Justice
Holmes argued that
[w]hen men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to
believe.., that the ultimate good desired ,s better reached by free trade in ideas-that the
best test of truth is the power of thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the
market .... That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution.
258. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
259. The Court has continually refused to accept that commercial speech is of equal dignity or
importance to that of noncommercial speech.
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means and then generate results which are the result of logic and consis-
tent values. Without adequate enunciation of the underlying normative
value, it is unlikely that the Court will consistently and logically apply
the value.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Greenmoss test, similar to any test a litigant may offer, was result
oriented. In contrast, the Court's consideration of any commerciality
test should be normative with results being used only to test its consis-
tency and practicability to achieve the ends the articulated value dictates.
Once the Court develops the normative basis for the commercial speech
doctrine, the test of commerciality should logically flow from it. In the
search for normative values, the Court should consider how a test would
be formulated to implement the value. An inquiry into appropriate tests
should focus on the inquiry into normative values. A meaningful test
should only be a tool to clarify and implement the chosen normative
value.
[Vol. 63:649
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol63/iss4/3
